Newcomb’s problem assumes two contradictory things about A. It assumes that, for the purpose of Causal Decision Theory, A is irrelevant and completely separated from your actual decision process; it assumes you have some kind of free will such that you can decide to two-box without this decision having been reflected in A. It also assumes that, for purposes of the actual outcome, A is quite relevant; if you decided to two-box, your decision will have been reflected in A.
Yes. Thank you. The Newcomb’s problem statement assumes that you both do and do not have free will.
EDIT: I suppose that to someone like Eliezer, who can see Newcomb’s problem as simply a problem that his decision logic must get right, rather than imagining himself inside the problem and asking what he would do, it isn’t necessary to assume free will. But if you see it that way, it isn’t a paradox. It’s hardly even interesting.
Yes. Thank you. The Newcomb’s problem statement assumes that you both do and do not have free will.
EDIT: I suppose that to someone like Eliezer, who can see Newcomb’s problem as simply a problem that his decision logic must get right, rather than imagining himself inside the problem and asking what he would do, it isn’t necessary to assume free will. But if you see it that way, it isn’t a paradox. It’s hardly even interesting.