Suppose we view consciousness as both a specific type of computation and a specific range of computable functions. For any N, there will always be a lookup table that appears conscious for a length of time N, in particular, “the lifetime of the conscious creature being simulated”. A lookup table, as Eliezer once argued, is more like a cellphone than a person—it must have been copied off of some sort of real, conscious entity.
Is the feature of a lookup table that makes it unconscious its improbability without certain types of computation, that is, the large amount of code? Is consciousness computing some function without using much code? That doesn’t seem right.
A Turing machine is much more reasonable than a lookup table.
Premise 1: I am conscious.
Premise 2: The physical universe I am part of may be computable.
Therefore: The physical universe I am part of may be a Turing machine.
Conclusion: Aspects of a Turing machine computation may be conscious.
What are aspects of a computation? I know them when I see them, or at least do occasionally. There is no reason I know of that a rigorous definition is impossible.
However, in physical reality, there exist no Turing machines. There are only finite state machines whose behavior emulates a quasi-Turing machine with a finite tape (or an analogous crippled finite version of some other Turing-complete theoretical construct).
Now, every finite-state machine can be implemented using a lookup table and a transition function that simply performs a lookup based on the current state and input. Any computers we have now or in the future can be only clever optimizations of this model. For example, von Neumann machines (i.e. computers as we know them) avoid the impossibly large lookup table by implementing the transition function in the form of a processor that, at each step, examines one small subset of the state and produces a new state that differs only by another small subset based on simple rules. (I’m describing the effect of a single machine instruction, of course.)
So, the question is: what exactly makes a lookup table deficient compared to a “real” computer, whatever that might be?
Ouch. That hurts. This may be a better way to state the problem, because it doesn’t intersect with the mysteries of time vs. static, and needing an observer.
Suppose we view consciousness as both a specific type of computation and a specific range of computable functions. For any N, there will always be a lookup table that appears conscious for a length of time N, in particular, “the lifetime of the conscious creature being simulated”. A lookup table, as Eliezer once argued, is more like a cellphone than a person—it must have been copied off of some sort of real, conscious entity.
Is the feature of a lookup table that makes it unconscious its improbability without certain types of computation, that is, the large amount of code? Is consciousness computing some function without using much code? That doesn’t seem right.
A Turing machine is much more reasonable than a lookup table.
Premise 1: I am conscious. Premise 2: The physical universe I am part of may be computable. Therefore: The physical universe I am part of may be a Turing machine. Conclusion: Aspects of a Turing machine computation may be conscious.
What are aspects of a computation? I know them when I see them, or at least do occasionally. There is no reason I know of that a rigorous definition is impossible.
However, in physical reality, there exist no Turing machines. There are only finite state machines whose behavior emulates a quasi-Turing machine with a finite tape (or an analogous crippled finite version of some other Turing-complete theoretical construct).
Now, every finite-state machine can be implemented using a lookup table and a transition function that simply performs a lookup based on the current state and input. Any computers we have now or in the future can be only clever optimizations of this model. For example, von Neumann machines (i.e. computers as we know them) avoid the impossibly large lookup table by implementing the transition function in the form of a processor that, at each step, examines one small subset of the state and produces a new state that differs only by another small subset based on simple rules. (I’m describing the effect of a single machine instruction, of course.)
So, the question is: what exactly makes a lookup table deficient compared to a “real” computer, whatever that might be?
Ouch. That hurts. This may be a better way to state the problem, because it doesn’t intersect with the mysteries of time vs. static, and needing an observer.
You might also be interested in this recent comment of mine, if you haven’t read it already:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/2m8/consciousness_of_simulations_uploads_a_reductio/2hky