Yeah I think this outcome is quite plausible, which is in part why I only claimed “some hope”. But
It’s also quite plausible that it won’t be like that, for example maybe a good solution to meta-philosophy will be fairly attractive to everyone despite invalidating deeply held object-level beliefs, or it only clearly invalidates such beliefs after being applied with a lot of time/compute, which won’t be available yet so people won’t reject the meta-philosophy based on such invalidations.
“What should be done if some/many people do reject the meta-philosophy based on it invalidating their beliefs?” is itself a philosophical question which the meta-philosophy could directly help us answer by accelerating philosophical progress, and/or that we can better answer after having a firmer handle on the nature of philosophy and therefore the ethics of changing people’s philosophical beliefs. Perhaps the conclusion will be that symmetrical persuasion tactics, or centrally imposed policies, are justified in this case. Or maybe we’ll use the understanding to find more effective asymmetrical or otherwise ethical persuasion tactics.
Basically my hope is that things become a lot clearer after we have a better understanding of metaphilosophy, as it seems to be a major obstacle to determining what should be done about the kind of problem described in the OP. I’m still curious whether you have any other solutions or approaches in mind.
Yeah I think this outcome is quite plausible, which is in part why I only claimed “some hope”. But
It’s also quite plausible that it won’t be like that, for example maybe a good solution to meta-philosophy will be fairly attractive to everyone despite invalidating deeply held object-level beliefs, or it only clearly invalidates such beliefs after being applied with a lot of time/compute, which won’t be available yet so people won’t reject the meta-philosophy based on such invalidations.
“What should be done if some/many people do reject the meta-philosophy based on it invalidating their beliefs?” is itself a philosophical question which the meta-philosophy could directly help us answer by accelerating philosophical progress, and/or that we can better answer after having a firmer handle on the nature of philosophy and therefore the ethics of changing people’s philosophical beliefs. Perhaps the conclusion will be that symmetrical persuasion tactics, or centrally imposed policies, are justified in this case. Or maybe we’ll use the understanding to find more effective asymmetrical or otherwise ethical persuasion tactics.
Basically my hope is that things become a lot clearer after we have a better understanding of metaphilosophy, as it seems to be a major obstacle to determining what should be done about the kind of problem described in the OP. I’m still curious whether you have any other solutions or approaches in mind.