llusionism basically says this: once we have successfully explained all our reports about consciousness, there will be nothing left to explain. Phenomenal experiences are nothing more than illusions. For illusionists, the meta-problem is not just a stepping stone, it’s the whole journey.
As a guiding intuition, consider the case of white light, which was regarded as an intrinsic property of nature until Newton discovered that it is in fact composed of seven distinct colours. White light is an illusion in the sense that it does not possess an intrinsic property “whiteness” (even though it seems to). Suppose we manage to explain, with a high degree of precision, exactly how and when we perceive white, and why we perceive it the way we do. We do not subsequently need to formulate a “hard problem of whiteness” asking why, on top of this, whiteness arises. Illusionists claim that consciousness is an illusion in the same sense that whiteness is.
I love your description of Illusionist thought, and pattern-match it as a successful application of self-reference (a cognitive tool I particularly value).
It seems to me however that it is just stated as fact that “phenomenal experiences are nothing more than illusions”.
I think the disconnect for me is that I equate consciousness to “being” which, in Eastern Philosophy, has some extrinsic properties (which are phenomenal).
This means that agents cannot wholly describe the “being” of another agent — its nature of being is not clearly bounded.
There is a correct explanation of our intuitions about consciousness which is independent of consciousness.
If there is such an explanation, and our intuitions are correct, then their correctness is a coincidence.
Initially I agreed with this because I thought you meant “a correct explanation of our intuitions about consciousness” in a partial sense — i.e. not a comprehensive explanation. This is then used to “debunk consciousness”.
It seems to me that we can talk about components of conscious experience without needing to reach a holistic definition, and then we might still be able to discuss Consciousness* as the components of conscious experience minus phenomena. Maybe this matches what you’re saying?
I’m on board with the core idea of intentionally building consciousness into AI (as far as we can ambiguously define it) as a driver of alignment… but perhaps at a later development stage when we’re confident we can absolve the AI of suffering.
It seems to me however that it is just stated as fact that “phenomenal experiences are nothing more than illusions”.
I think the disconnect for me is that I equate consciousness to “being” which, in Eastern Philosophy, has some extrinsic properties (which are phenomenal).
I’m no expert in Eastern Philosophy conceptions of consciousness, I’ve been meaning to but haven’t gotten around to digging into it.
What I would say is this: for any phenomenal property attributed to consciousness (e.g. extrinsic ones), you can formulate an illusionist theory of it. You can be an illusionist about many things in the world (not always rightly).
The debunking argument might have to be tweaked, e.g. it might not be about “intuitions”, and of course you could reject this kind of argument. Personally I would expect it to also be quite strong across the “phenomenal” range. I would be very happy to see some (counter-)examples!
Initially I agreed with this because I thought you meant “a correct explanation of our intuitions about consciousness” in a partial sense — i.e. not a comprehensive explanation. This is then used to “debunk consciousness”.
It seems to me that we can talk about components of conscious experience without needing to reach a holistic definition, and then we might still be able to discuss Consciousness* as the components of conscious experience minus phenomena. Maybe this matches what you’re saying?
I guess this sounds a bit like weak illusionism? Where phenomenal consciousness exists, but some of our intuitions about it are wrong. We would indeed also be able to discuss consciousness* (with asterisk), but we’d run into other problems and I don’t think the argument about moral intuitions would be nearly as strong. Weak illusionism basically collapses to realism. It would point to consciousness* being more cognitively important so many of the points would be preserved. Let me know if this isn’t what you meant.
I love your description of Illusionist thought, and pattern-match it as a successful application of self-reference (a cognitive tool I particularly value).
It seems to me however that it is just stated as fact that “phenomenal experiences are nothing more than illusions”.
I think the disconnect for me is that I equate consciousness to “being” which, in Eastern Philosophy, has some extrinsic properties (which are phenomenal).
This means that agents cannot wholly describe the “being” of another agent — its nature of being is not clearly bounded.
Initially I agreed with this because I thought you meant “a correct explanation of our intuitions about consciousness” in a partial sense — i.e. not a comprehensive explanation. This is then used to “debunk consciousness”.
It seems to me that we can talk about components of conscious experience without needing to reach a holistic definition, and then we might still be able to discuss Consciousness* as the components of conscious experience minus phenomena. Maybe this matches what you’re saying?
I’m on board with the core idea of intentionally building consciousness into AI (as far as we can ambiguously define it) as a driver of alignment… but perhaps at a later development stage when we’re confident we can absolve the AI of suffering.
Thanks for the comment and the kind words!
I’m no expert in Eastern Philosophy conceptions of consciousness, I’ve been meaning to but haven’t gotten around to digging into it.
What I would say is this: for any phenomenal property attributed to consciousness (e.g. extrinsic ones), you can formulate an illusionist theory of it. You can be an illusionist about many things in the world (not always rightly).
The debunking argument might have to be tweaked, e.g. it might not be about “intuitions”, and of course you could reject this kind of argument. Personally I would expect it to also be quite strong across the “phenomenal” range. I would be very happy to see some (counter-)examples!
I guess this sounds a bit like weak illusionism? Where phenomenal consciousness exists, but some of our intuitions about it are wrong. We would indeed also be able to discuss consciousness* (with asterisk), but we’d run into other problems and I don’t think the argument about moral intuitions would be nearly as strong. Weak illusionism basically collapses to realism. It would point to consciousness* being more cognitively important so many of the points would be preserved. Let me know if this isn’t what you meant.