Out of curiosity I looked up what you were teaching in the spring—the problem of induction, right? (I’ll be surprised and impressed if you managed to foist a reading from Li and Vitanyi on your students :P ) I’m definitely curious about what you think of the progress in probability, and what morals one could draw from it.
I’d actually checked because I thought it would be the philosophy of psychology. That seems like one of those areas where there were, in hindsight, obvious past mistakes, and it’s not clear how much of the progress has been emprirical versus things that could have been figured out using the empirical knowledge of the time.
No Kolmogorov complexity—the course was really a history from Hume to about 1970. The next time I teach a seminar, I’m hoping to cover 1970 to the present. Still, this time around, a lot of the readings were technical: Ramsey, Jeffreys, Fisher, Neyman, De Finetti, Savage, Carnap, and others. You can see the full reading list here.
I agree that a nice course on progress could be done with a philosophy of psychology focus. I expect that progress-skeptics would object that the progress is in psychology itself, not in the philosophy of psychology. (I wouldn’t share that skepticism for a couple of reasons.) Maybe if the course were framed more in terms of philosophy of mind and computation? Have you read Glymour’s “introduction” to philosophy, Thinking Things Through? It has that feel to me, though it’s pitched more like, “Here are things that philosophy has contributed to human knowledge,” and it ranges over more than mind and computation.
Out of curiosity I looked up what you were teaching in the spring—the problem of induction, right? (I’ll be surprised and impressed if you managed to foist a reading from Li and Vitanyi on your students :P ) I’m definitely curious about what you think of the progress in probability, and what morals one could draw from it.
I’d actually checked because I thought it would be the philosophy of psychology. That seems like one of those areas where there were, in hindsight, obvious past mistakes, and it’s not clear how much of the progress has been emprirical versus things that could have been figured out using the empirical knowledge of the time.
No Kolmogorov complexity—the course was really a history from Hume to about 1970. The next time I teach a seminar, I’m hoping to cover 1970 to the present. Still, this time around, a lot of the readings were technical: Ramsey, Jeffreys, Fisher, Neyman, De Finetti, Savage, Carnap, and others. You can see the full reading list here.
I agree that a nice course on progress could be done with a philosophy of psychology focus. I expect that progress-skeptics would object that the progress is in psychology itself, not in the philosophy of psychology. (I wouldn’t share that skepticism for a couple of reasons.) Maybe if the course were framed more in terms of philosophy of mind and computation? Have you read Glymour’s “introduction” to philosophy, Thinking Things Through? It has that feel to me, though it’s pitched more like, “Here are things that philosophy has contributed to human knowledge,” and it ranges over more than mind and computation.