I wouldn’t dispute there’s some difference, i.e., given a set of normative values, an inner/outer observer would judge (and feel?) the situations differently depending on their values. I just don’t think it is doing any truth-tracking about reality. Your second example (‘the misery-preferer is normatively confused’) reminds me of a strategy I usually find in moral realists which I do not find convincing: it tries to establish a parallelism between logical rationality and normative rationality (there are ends or actions you have reason to choose regardless of your desires). I just disagree with the latter: there are no ends you have ‘rational reason’ to choose except those you desire as part of your preferences, and this is just some kind of quasi-Kantian attempt to smuggle normative ethics into reason. Affirming someone is ‘normatively confused’ seems to imply there is some correct, ‘objective’ set of norms a rational being has to follow lest he/she fall into error. Reason can tell you that your beliefs are inconsistent, or that your chosen means won’t achieve your ends, but I don’t see how reason by itself can supply the terminal ends.
I just don’t think it is doing any truth-tracking about reality.
Well, it tracks the truth that human values do exist, even if they vary somewhat. But agreed that it doesn’t tell you that there’s a source for normative values, or what that source might be.
Reason can tell you that your beliefs are inconsistent, or that your chosen means won’t achieve your ends, but I don’t see how reason by itself can supply the terminal ends.
Such a good point. Instrumental values are in the realm of logic (logically derived from terminal values) -- so given a terminal value, we can be logically right or wrong about the instrumental values that follow.
I have wondered (but perhaps haven’t stated clearly) if it is a fact about conscious minds that we have but one terminal value—a vague desire for “the good.” All our other values, even health, love, and not-misery, are instrumentally derived. If it is a fact that minds desire what they deem good (not that I can prove it), would that sway you at all toward moral realism?
In other words if it is a fact about minds that they desire the good, then the question becomes not “does goodness exist” but “what is good?”
Or would you just say well that makes goodness real for minds, but not objectively? This may be fair, but what does “objectively” mean in this case?
That’s a good and deep question, for which I don’t have an answer. My intuition about the answer would be no, though, i.e., we have different values/preferences with a complicated history and a degree of inconsistency forming some n-dimensional vector space that cannot be reduced to a simple scalar. But even granting that they could be reduced to a vague ‘desire for the good’ terminal value, it would seem you can develop this in wildly different and opposite ways. The fact that minds desire a common x would, if proven (like, sampling aliens for example) update me towards the existence of some shared, emergent subjective belief that arises in sentient and intelligent creatures, but I don’t see how it would update me towards believing this belief is ‘true’ in the naturalist, correspondence-to-an-external-reality kind of sense. I think I’d agree with your second interpretation, ‘that makes goodness real for minds, but not objectively’. Objectivity is a term whose use I always find extremely confusing. It makes sense to talk about natural phenomena with the lens of “based on real facts, evidence, and logic without letting personal feelings, likes, or unfair biases change your view”, because we’re assuming they are mind-independent and follow laws that are orthogonal to our subjective feelings, likes and biases. When you talk about what minds believe, it becomes messier (because a lot of facts are socially constructed, like money or laws, and not independent of feelings, likes and biases; in fact, they are intrinsic to what it is like to be a human, part of a human community with its intellectual and material limitations. What does ‘real’ mean when we say ‘this piece of paper is worth 100 dollars’ except something like “well, this is some kind of useful and enforced belief/practice which is contingent on the existence and interactions of a particular type of being with properties x, y, z”). There’s like three tiers here: stuff that’s mind-independent (it doesn’t matter what any mind or group of minds believe and think with respect to the underlying truth), stuff that’s intersubjective (which is mind-dependent but not amenable to change by an individual) and purely subjective stuff (which is completely dependent on the subject’s subjective beliefs, feelings, whatever). Morality is for me something that belongs to somewhere between the second and third tier (the ‘agreed social norms’ is 2nd tier, the personal belief that x is wrong independently of what anyone thinks, to 3rd tier).
So on moral realism: I just feel there’s nothing you can really use for updating on the view that there are “stance-independent moral truths whose truth does not depend on what any mind happens to value or desire.” (Theology is more updatable here; like, you just need to have God(s) appear, interact with you and do supernatural stuff repeatedly and measurably). If you view of moral realism is something like “Given creatures with volition, reason, different interests, etc..., who would want to engage in positive-sum social games, there might exist an optimal configuration of the latter that would be reachable by different creatures without any contact with each other”, then while I am still somewhat skeptic, this is something I can imagine to be true, and I can think of ways in which it can be updated.
I wouldn’t dispute there’s some difference, i.e., given a set of normative values, an inner/outer observer would judge (and feel?) the situations differently depending on their values. I just don’t think it is doing any truth-tracking about reality. Your second example (‘the misery-preferer is normatively confused’) reminds me of a strategy I usually find in moral realists which I do not find convincing: it tries to establish a parallelism between logical rationality and normative rationality (there are ends or actions you have reason to choose regardless of your desires). I just disagree with the latter: there are no ends you have ‘rational reason’ to choose except those you desire as part of your preferences, and this is just some kind of quasi-Kantian attempt to smuggle normative ethics into reason. Affirming someone is ‘normatively confused’ seems to imply there is some correct, ‘objective’ set of norms a rational being has to follow lest he/she fall into error. Reason can tell you that your beliefs are inconsistent, or that your chosen means won’t achieve your ends, but I don’t see how reason by itself can supply the terminal ends.
Well, it tracks the truth that human values do exist, even if they vary somewhat. But agreed that it doesn’t tell you that there’s a source for normative values, or what that source might be.
Such a good point. Instrumental values are in the realm of logic (logically derived from terminal values) -- so given a terminal value, we can be logically right or wrong about the instrumental values that follow.
I have wondered (but perhaps haven’t stated clearly) if it is a fact about conscious minds that we have but one terminal value—a vague desire for “the good.” All our other values, even health, love, and not-misery, are instrumentally derived. If it is a fact that minds desire what they deem good (not that I can prove it), would that sway you at all toward moral realism?
In other words if it is a fact about minds that they desire the good, then the question becomes not “does goodness exist” but “what is good?”
Or would you just say well that makes goodness real for minds, but not objectively? This may be fair, but what does “objectively” mean in this case?
That’s a good and deep question, for which I don’t have an answer. My intuition about the answer would be no, though, i.e., we have different values/preferences with a complicated history and a degree of inconsistency forming some n-dimensional vector space that cannot be reduced to a simple scalar. But even granting that they could be reduced to a vague ‘desire for the good’ terminal value, it would seem you can develop this in wildly different and opposite ways. The fact that minds desire a common x would, if proven (like, sampling aliens for example) update me towards the existence of some shared, emergent subjective belief that arises in sentient and intelligent creatures, but I don’t see how it would update me towards believing this belief is ‘true’ in the naturalist, correspondence-to-an-external-reality kind of sense. I think I’d agree with your second interpretation, ‘that makes goodness real for minds, but not objectively’. Objectivity is a term whose use I always find extremely confusing. It makes sense to talk about natural phenomena with the lens of “based on real facts, evidence, and logic without letting personal feelings, likes, or unfair biases change your view”, because we’re assuming they are mind-independent and follow laws that are orthogonal to our subjective feelings, likes and biases. When you talk about what minds believe, it becomes messier (because a lot of facts are socially constructed, like money or laws, and not independent of feelings, likes and biases; in fact, they are intrinsic to what it is like to be a human, part of a human community with its intellectual and material limitations. What does ‘real’ mean when we say ‘this piece of paper is worth 100 dollars’ except something like “well, this is some kind of useful and enforced belief/practice which is contingent on the existence and interactions of a particular type of being with properties x, y, z”). There’s like three tiers here: stuff that’s mind-independent (it doesn’t matter what any mind or group of minds believe and think with respect to the underlying truth), stuff that’s intersubjective (which is mind-dependent but not amenable to change by an individual) and purely subjective stuff (which is completely dependent on the subject’s subjective beliefs, feelings, whatever). Morality is for me something that belongs to somewhere between the second and third tier (the ‘agreed social norms’ is 2nd tier, the personal belief that x is wrong independently of what anyone thinks, to 3rd tier).
So on moral realism: I just feel there’s nothing you can really use for updating on the view that there are “stance-independent moral truths whose truth does not depend on what any mind happens to value or desire.” (Theology is more updatable here; like, you just need to have God(s) appear, interact with you and do supernatural stuff repeatedly and measurably). If you view of moral realism is something like “Given creatures with volition, reason, different interests, etc..., who would want to engage in positive-sum social games, there might exist an optimal configuration of the latter that would be reachable by different creatures without any contact with each other”, then while I am still somewhat skeptic, this is something I can imagine to be true, and I can think of ways in which it can be updated.