A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.