I’m saying that the way I apprehend, or reflexively relate to, my past or present experiences, as belonging to “myself”, is revealing of reflective access, which itself is suggestive of reflective storage.
If a hypothetical being never even silently apprehended an experience as theirs, that hypothetical being doesn’t sound conscious. I personally have no memories of being conscious but not being able to syntactically describe my experiences, but as far as I understand infant development that’s a phase, and it seems logically possible anyway.
I’m saying that the way I apprehend, or reflexively relate to, my past or present experiences, as belonging to “myself”, is revealing of reflective access, which itself is suggestive of reflective storage.
If a hypothetical being never even silently apprehended an experience as theirs, that hypothetical being doesn’t sound conscious. I personally have no memories of being conscious but not being able to syntactically describe my experiences, but as far as I understand infant development that’s a phase, and it seems logically possible anyway.