I don’t think I have the grasp on these subjects to hang in this, but this is great. -- I hope someone else comments in a more detailed manner.
In Popperian analysis, who ends the discussion of “what’s better?” You seem to have alluded to it being “whatever has no criticisms.” Is that accurate?
try to find relevant evidence to update the probabilities (this depends on more assumptions)
Why would Bayesian epistemology not be able to use the same evidence that Popperians used (e.g. the 1920 paper) and thus not require “assumptions” for new evidence? My rookie statement would be that the Bayesian has access to all the same kinds of evidence and tools that the Popperian approach does, as well as a reliable method for estimating probability outcomes.
Could you also clarify the difference between “conjecture” and “assumption.” Is it just that you’re saying that a conjecture is just a starting point for departure, whereas an assumption is assumed to be true?
An assumption seems both 1) justified if it has supporting evidence to make it highly likely as true to the best of our knowledge and 2) able to be just as “revisable” given counter-evidence as a “conjecture.”
Are you thinking that a Bayesian “assumption” is set in stone or that it could not be updated/modified if new evidence came along?
Lastly, what are “conjectures” based on? Are they random? If not, it would seem that they must be supported by at least some kind of assumptions to even have a reason for being conjectured in the first place. I think of them as “best guesses” and don’t see that as wildly different from the assumptions needed to get off the ground in any other analysis method.
In Popperian analysis, who ends the discussion of “what’s better?” You seem to have alluded to it being “whatever has no criticisms.” Is that accurate?
Yes, “no criticisms” is accurate. There are issues of what to do when you have a number of theories remaining which isn’t exactly one which I didn’t go into.
It’s not a matter of “who”—learning is a cooperative thing and people can use their own individual judgment. In a free society it’s OK if they don’t agree (for now—there’s always hope for later) about almost all topics.
I don’t regard the 1920 paper as evidence. It contains explanations and arguments. By “evidence” I normally mean “empirical evidence”—i.e. observation data. Is that not what you guys mean? There is some relevant evidence for liberalism vs socialism (e.g. the USSR’s empirical failure) but I don’t regard this evidence as crucial, and I don’t think that if you were to rely only on it that would work well (e.g. people could say the USSR did it wrong and if they did something a bit different, which has never been tried, then it would work. And the evidence could not refute that.)
BTW in the Popperian approach, the role of evidence is purely in criticism (and inspiration for ideas, which has no formal rules or anything). This is in contrast to inductive approaches (in general) which attempt to positively support/confirm/whatever theories with the weight of evidence.
If the Bayesian approach uses arguments as a type of evidence, and updates probabilities accordingly, how is that done? How is it decided which arguments win, and how much they win by? One aspect of the criticism approach is theories do not have probabilities but only two statuses: they are refuted or non-refuted. There’s never an issue of judging how strong an argument is (how do you do that?).
If you try to follow along with the Popperian approach too closely (to claim to have all the same tools) one objection will be that I don’t see Bayesian literature acknowledging Popper’s tools as valuable, talking about how to use them, etc… I will suspect that you aren’t in line with the Bayesian tradition. You might be improving it, but good luck convincing e.g. Yudkowsky of that.
The difference between a conjecture and an assumption is just as you say: conjectures aren’t assumed true but are open to criticism and debate.
I think the word “assumption” means not revisable (normally assumptions are made in a particular context, e.g. you assume X for the purposes of a particular debate which means you don’t question it. But you could have a different debate later and question it.). But I didn’t think Bayesianism made any assumptions except for its foundational ones. I don’t mind if you want to use the word a different way.
Regarding justification by supporting evidence, that is a very problematic concept which Popper criticized. The starting place of the criticism is to ask what “support” means. And in particular, what is the difference between support and mere consistency (non-contradiction)?
Conjectures are not based on anything and not supported. They are whatever you care to imagine. It’s good to have reasons for conjectures but there are no rules about what the reasons should be, and conjectures are never rejected because of the reason they were conjectured (nor because of the source of the conjecture), only because of criticisms of their substance. If someone makes too many poor conjectures and annoys people, it’s possible to criticize his methodology in order to help him. Popperian epistemology does not have any built-in guidelines for conjecturing on which it depends; they can be changed and violated as people see fit. I would rather call them “guesses” than “best guesses” because it’s often a good idea for one person to make several conjectures, including ones he suspects are mistaken, in order to learn more about them. It should not be each person puts forward his best theory and they face off, but everyone puts forward all the theories he thinks may be interesting and then everyone cooperates in criticizing all of them.
Edit: BTW I use the words “theory” and “idea” interchangeably. I do not mean by “theory” ideas with a certain amount of status/justification. I think “idea” is the better word but I frequently forget to use it (because Popper and Deutsch say “theory” all the time and I got used to it).
I don’t think I have the grasp on these subjects to hang in this, but this is great. -- I hope someone else comments in a more detailed manner.
In Popperian analysis, who ends the discussion of “what’s better?” You seem to have alluded to it being “whatever has no criticisms.” Is that accurate?
Why would Bayesian epistemology not be able to use the same evidence that Popperians used (e.g. the 1920 paper) and thus not require “assumptions” for new evidence? My rookie statement would be that the Bayesian has access to all the same kinds of evidence and tools that the Popperian approach does, as well as a reliable method for estimating probability outcomes.
Could you also clarify the difference between “conjecture” and “assumption.” Is it just that you’re saying that a conjecture is just a starting point for departure, whereas an assumption is assumed to be true?
An assumption seems both 1) justified if it has supporting evidence to make it highly likely as true to the best of our knowledge and 2) able to be just as “revisable” given counter-evidence as a “conjecture.”
Are you thinking that a Bayesian “assumption” is set in stone or that it could not be updated/modified if new evidence came along?
Lastly, what are “conjectures” based on? Are they random? If not, it would seem that they must be supported by at least some kind of assumptions to even have a reason for being conjectured in the first place. I think of them as “best guesses” and don’t see that as wildly different from the assumptions needed to get off the ground in any other analysis method.
Yes, “no criticisms” is accurate. There are issues of what to do when you have a number of theories remaining which isn’t exactly one which I didn’t go into.
It’s not a matter of “who”—learning is a cooperative thing and people can use their own individual judgment. In a free society it’s OK if they don’t agree (for now—there’s always hope for later) about almost all topics.
I don’t regard the 1920 paper as evidence. It contains explanations and arguments. By “evidence” I normally mean “empirical evidence”—i.e. observation data. Is that not what you guys mean? There is some relevant evidence for liberalism vs socialism (e.g. the USSR’s empirical failure) but I don’t regard this evidence as crucial, and I don’t think that if you were to rely only on it that would work well (e.g. people could say the USSR did it wrong and if they did something a bit different, which has never been tried, then it would work. And the evidence could not refute that.)
BTW in the Popperian approach, the role of evidence is purely in criticism (and inspiration for ideas, which has no formal rules or anything). This is in contrast to inductive approaches (in general) which attempt to positively support/confirm/whatever theories with the weight of evidence.
If the Bayesian approach uses arguments as a type of evidence, and updates probabilities accordingly, how is that done? How is it decided which arguments win, and how much they win by? One aspect of the criticism approach is theories do not have probabilities but only two statuses: they are refuted or non-refuted. There’s never an issue of judging how strong an argument is (how do you do that?).
If you try to follow along with the Popperian approach too closely (to claim to have all the same tools) one objection will be that I don’t see Bayesian literature acknowledging Popper’s tools as valuable, talking about how to use them, etc… I will suspect that you aren’t in line with the Bayesian tradition. You might be improving it, but good luck convincing e.g. Yudkowsky of that.
The difference between a conjecture and an assumption is just as you say: conjectures aren’t assumed true but are open to criticism and debate.
I think the word “assumption” means not revisable (normally assumptions are made in a particular context, e.g. you assume X for the purposes of a particular debate which means you don’t question it. But you could have a different debate later and question it.). But I didn’t think Bayesianism made any assumptions except for its foundational ones. I don’t mind if you want to use the word a different way.
Regarding justification by supporting evidence, that is a very problematic concept which Popper criticized. The starting place of the criticism is to ask what “support” means. And in particular, what is the difference between support and mere consistency (non-contradiction)?
Conjectures are not based on anything and not supported. They are whatever you care to imagine. It’s good to have reasons for conjectures but there are no rules about what the reasons should be, and conjectures are never rejected because of the reason they were conjectured (nor because of the source of the conjecture), only because of criticisms of their substance. If someone makes too many poor conjectures and annoys people, it’s possible to criticize his methodology in order to help him. Popperian epistemology does not have any built-in guidelines for conjecturing on which it depends; they can be changed and violated as people see fit. I would rather call them “guesses” than “best guesses” because it’s often a good idea for one person to make several conjectures, including ones he suspects are mistaken, in order to learn more about them. It should not be each person puts forward his best theory and they face off, but everyone puts forward all the theories he thinks may be interesting and then everyone cooperates in criticizing all of them.
Edit: BTW I use the words “theory” and “idea” interchangeably. I do not mean by “theory” ideas with a certain amount of status/justification. I think “idea” is the better word but I frequently forget to use it (because Popper and Deutsch say “theory” all the time and I got used to it).