In your theory, do the probabilities of the infinitely many theories add up to 1?
Does increasing their probabilities ever change the ordering of theories which assigned the same probability to some evidence/event?
If all finite sets of evidence leave infinitely many theories unchanged in ordering, then would we basically be acting on the a priori conclusions built into our way of assigning the initial probabilities?
If we were, would that be rational, in your view?
And do you have anything to say about the regress problem?
In your theory, do the probabilities of the infinitely many theories add up to 1?
Does increasing their probabilities ever change the ordering of theories which assigned the same probability to some evidence/event?
If all finite sets of evidence leave infinitely many theories unchanged in ordering, then would we basically be acting on the a priori conclusions built into our way of assigning the initial probabilities?
If we were, would that be rational, in your view?
And do you have anything to say about the regress problem?