Semiotics, as a description of the entirety of communication, is a set which contains itself, and moreover contains the set theory which says that it contains itself, and also contains every possible notation system by which its properties might be defined.
Any formal process of defining semiotics, in a sense, defines the formal process by which anything is defined.
If semiotics exists in a non-trivial and complete form, it violates Godel’s incompleteness theorem, because it encapsulates and defines all possible arithmetic systems, and every possible provable statement within any arithmetic system can be proven within it. Therefore, semiotics must exist, if it exists at all, in a trivial and/or incomplete form.
But what do you refer to, when you refer to “logic”? Do you perhaps mean boolean logic? Predicate logic? Propositional logic?
There’s a common reference class, but no common implementation, when you point at “logic”. Each kind of logic is incomplete, but that is fine, because each kind of logic is domain-specific, and you use the kind of logic which is most complete with respect to the problem you’re interested in. Which actually raises a point about something you said:
Are there multiple “sciences” all using the name “semiotics”? Does semiotics make any falsifiable claims? Does it make any claims whose meanings can be uniquely determined and that were not claimed before semiotics?
Yes. No. No. The exact same things are true of “logic”, however, in its broadest sense. It’s only when you get into the specific “sciences” (or domains of logic) that anything interesting is allowed to happen.
Okay, so then semiotics is mostly a set of proofs I take it. What, then, are the major assumptions underlying those proofs and which are the most important proofs built on those assumptions?
No. That explanation was a way of explaining why “semiotics” as a general field of study is not actually going to be able to say anything interesting at all.
Oh, a number of reasons; The carefree tone of the approach. The implication that I didn’t spend too much time considering my opinion. The fact that my carefree, ill-considered tone is combined with a rejection of the idea that studied experts in a particular field actually have a clear idea what they’re talking about based on a clearly limited understanding of what it is they’re studying, as opposed to your pretty clearly well-thought out and considered response to a field you actually investigated.
The parent argument proves too much, I think. Try adding the following, for example:
Since any communication can be described as the transmission of information, and, in order to be transmitted, this information must exist, any formal system of semiotics (providing it exists) can be encompassed by a larger formal system of physics. Taken together with the earlier observation (about the triviality of semiotics) we conclude that any formal explanation of physics must be trivial and/or incomplete.
I think the moral of the story is that one should not attempt to invoke Gödels Incompleteness Theorem in Social Science.
Semiotics, as a description of the entirety of communication, is a set which contains itself, and moreover contains the set theory which says that it contains itself, and also contains every possible notation system by which its properties might be defined.
Any formal process of defining semiotics, in a sense, defines the formal process by which anything is defined.
If semiotics exists in a non-trivial and complete form, it violates Godel’s incompleteness theorem, because it encapsulates and defines all possible arithmetic systems, and every possible provable statement within any arithmetic system can be proven within it. Therefore, semiotics must exist, if it exists at all, in a trivial and/or incomplete form.
I’m pretty sure.
Okay, but I could say the same thing about logic.
But what do you refer to, when you refer to “logic”? Do you perhaps mean boolean logic? Predicate logic? Propositional logic?
There’s a common reference class, but no common implementation, when you point at “logic”. Each kind of logic is incomplete, but that is fine, because each kind of logic is domain-specific, and you use the kind of logic which is most complete with respect to the problem you’re interested in. Which actually raises a point about something you said:
Yes. No. No. The exact same things are true of “logic”, however, in its broadest sense. It’s only when you get into the specific “sciences” (or domains of logic) that anything interesting is allowed to happen.
Okay, so then semiotics is mostly a set of proofs I take it. What, then, are the major assumptions underlying those proofs and which are the most important proofs built on those assumptions?
Semiotics seems to be the idea that everything should be analyzed in terms of its communicative function.
No. That explanation was a way of explaining why “semiotics” as a general field of study is not actually going to be able to say anything interesting at all.
Sorry; I don’t know why your comment got downvoted so much. It seems reasonable to me.
Oh, a number of reasons; The carefree tone of the approach. The implication that I didn’t spend too much time considering my opinion. The fact that my carefree, ill-considered tone is combined with a rejection of the idea that studied experts in a particular field actually have a clear idea what they’re talking about based on a clearly limited understanding of what it is they’re studying, as opposed to your pretty clearly well-thought out and considered response to a field you actually investigated.
The parent argument proves too much, I think. Try adding the following, for example:
Since any communication can be described as the transmission of information, and, in order to be transmitted, this information must exist, any formal system of semiotics (providing it exists) can be encompassed by a larger formal system of physics. Taken together with the earlier observation (about the triviality of semiotics) we conclude that any formal explanation of physics must be trivial and/or incomplete.
I think the moral of the story is that one should not attempt to invoke Gödels Incompleteness Theorem in Social Science.
I think the parent argument is saying that a social science should not claim it supersedes logic.
Also, I’m afraid we may both be doing semiotics.