There is the classic error of conflating the normative with the descriptive, presuming that what is good is also true. But the inverse is also a mistake I see people make all the time: conflating the descriptive for the normative. The descriptive is subject to change by human action, so maybe the latter is the worse of the two mistakes. Crudely, the stereotypical liberal makes the former mistake and the stereotypical reactionary makes the latter.
Except people prefer being stupid and making mistakes, thus what is true is good.
Except two systems of people with the same preferences can lead to disparate outcomes, e.g. war and peace, thus what is good may not be true.
Except those systems are controlled by people who prefer e.g. war over peace, thus what is true is good.
Except those in control would prefer they were less stupid and made fewer mistakes, thus what is good may not be true.
Except it’s pretty naive to think the smartest people in the world are actually making mistakes on the order of tens of millions of QALYs, thus what is true is probably good.
Except the systems that give people power rarely optimize for intelligence or introspection, thus what is good is not always true.
Except the people affected by these systems have the power to make them better, if they desired it above being stupid and making mistakes, thus what is true is good.
I think it is actually quite rare to live in a world where what is good is not also true. The best I can come up with is a very constrained world, maybe two pre-historic tribes that could cooperate, but due to some accidents and misunderstndings there’s now common knowledge the other tribe will murder you if you so much as look at them.
Normative claims describe desired world states. To the extent they are coherent and possible, they cannot be argued against. They are merely a shape the world could be. Descriptive statements make neutral claims about features of the world. Toy examples of each mistake:
“Having no legs is not good; I bet that crippled man has invisible legs.”
“That crippled man has no legs; this must be the way of things and so just and right”
In practice, this tends to be done with themes and processes and not at such a crude, silly level. The stereotypical reactionary might identify selective processes, themselves, as ends. The stereotypical liberal might pretend selective processes don’t exist. The reactionary may be right about his values, and then is not making a mistake here. But in many cases I think they are confusing the descriptive for the normative and do not value what they think they value.
At a societal scale, the descriptive is usually the normative, just hidden away in billions of interacting preferences. The reactionary confuses this agglomerated good with their own which is bad if they ever want to change it to align more closely with their own, but they don’t, because they prefer being stupid and making this mistake. It is also good from a stability perspective for most people to be biased towards this kind of mistake, as the individual good becomes subservient to the common good.
“Having no legs is not good; I bet the crippled man has metaphorical legs to stand upon,” said the revolutionary as he crawled up the steps to the capital building, inconveniencing the rest of society for his greater cause.
“That crippled man has no legs; this must be the way of things and so just and right,” said the cripple, and no longer complained.
There is the classic error of conflating the normative with the descriptive, presuming that what is good is also true. But the inverse is also a mistake I see people make all the time: conflating the descriptive for the normative. The descriptive is subject to change by human action, so maybe the latter is the worse of the two mistakes. Crudely, the stereotypical liberal makes the former mistake and the stereotypical reactionary makes the latter.
Except people prefer being stupid and making mistakes, thus what is true is good.
Except two systems of people with the same preferences can lead to disparate outcomes, e.g. war and peace, thus what is good may not be true.
Except those systems are controlled by people who prefer e.g. war over peace, thus what is true is good.
Except those in control would prefer they were less stupid and made fewer mistakes, thus what is good may not be true.
Except it’s pretty naive to think the smartest people in the world are actually making mistakes on the order of tens of millions of QALYs, thus what is true is probably good.
Except the systems that give people power rarely optimize for intelligence or introspection, thus what is good is not always true.
Except the people affected by these systems have the power to make them better, if they desired it above being stupid and making mistakes, thus what is true is good.
I think it is actually quite rare to live in a world where what is good is not also true. The best I can come up with is a very constrained world, maybe two pre-historic tribes that could cooperate, but due to some accidents and misunderstndings there’s now common knowledge the other tribe will murder you if you so much as look at them.
Normative claims describe desired world states. To the extent they are coherent and possible, they cannot be argued against. They are merely a shape the world could be. Descriptive statements make neutral claims about features of the world. Toy examples of each mistake:
“Having no legs is not good; I bet that crippled man has invisible legs.”
“That crippled man has no legs; this must be the way of things and so just and right”
In practice, this tends to be done with themes and processes and not at such a crude, silly level. The stereotypical reactionary might identify selective processes, themselves, as ends. The stereotypical liberal might pretend selective processes don’t exist. The reactionary may be right about his values, and then is not making a mistake here. But in many cases I think they are confusing the descriptive for the normative and do not value what they think they value.
At a societal scale, the descriptive is usually the normative, just hidden away in billions of interacting preferences. The reactionary confuses this agglomerated good with their own which is bad if they ever want to change it to align more closely with their own, but they don’t, because they prefer being stupid and making this mistake. It is also good from a stability perspective for most people to be biased towards this kind of mistake, as the individual good becomes subservient to the common good.
“Having no legs is not good; I bet the crippled man has metaphorical legs to stand upon,” said the revolutionary as he crawled up the steps to the capital building, inconveniencing the rest of society for his greater cause.
“That crippled man has no legs; this must be the way of things and so just and right,” said the cripple, and no longer complained.