There was a hypothesis that people’s different opinions on questions involving consciousness have largely to do with personal experiences that differ between people. People who always subvocalize may be unable to imagine that distinct ways of processing the language can exist.
Thanks for the clarification! This reminds me of Galton’s research on mental imagery, and I can see how people who do or don’t subvocalize could potentially have different intuitions about various aspects of consciousness. However, I think I’m still not understanding your suggestion.
For context, here are the major responses to the Chinese Room thought experiment that I’m aware of (do you know of others?):
such a system is not possible (i.e. it wouldn’t work—you couldn’t get correct answers to questions this way)
such a system is possible, and it would be sentient
such a system is possible, and it wouldn’t be sentient, nor would any other artificial thinking process
such a system is possible, and it wouldn’t be sentient, but other artificial thinking processes could be, depending on how they work
My own first guess is that if there is a connection between subvocalization and intuitions about the CR, it would be that subvocalizers are more likely to think explicit internal monologue is necessary for consciousness, and so would be more likely to choose #4 over #2, if they are already reductionists.
Was your suggestion that those who don’t subvocalize would be more inclined to choose 1, 3, or 4 above, or something else? And likewise for those who do subvocalize.
I’m confused as to why the two would be related at all.
There was a hypothesis that people’s different opinions on questions involving consciousness have largely to do with personal experiences that differ between people. People who always subvocalize may be unable to imagine that distinct ways of processing the language can exist.
Thanks for the clarification! This reminds me of Galton’s research on mental imagery, and I can see how people who do or don’t subvocalize could potentially have different intuitions about various aspects of consciousness. However, I think I’m still not understanding your suggestion.
For context, here are the major responses to the Chinese Room thought experiment that I’m aware of (do you know of others?):
such a system is not possible (i.e. it wouldn’t work—you couldn’t get correct answers to questions this way)
such a system is possible, and it would be sentient
such a system is possible, and it wouldn’t be sentient, nor would any other artificial thinking process
such a system is possible, and it wouldn’t be sentient, but other artificial thinking processes could be, depending on how they work
My own first guess is that if there is a connection between subvocalization and intuitions about the CR, it would be that subvocalizers are more likely to think explicit internal monologue is necessary for consciousness, and so would be more likely to choose #4 over #2, if they are already reductionists.
Was your suggestion that those who don’t subvocalize would be more inclined to choose 1, 3, or 4 above, or something else? And likewise for those who do subvocalize.