Causal interactions? The answer is rather trivial. In order for the separate meaningless Planck moments of the brain’s existence to be able to combine into “granules of qualia” that have integrity in time, they must be connected by something. It is usually assumed that there are causal relationships behind this, which can be likened to computational processes.
But many transhumanists, it seems to me, show some duality of thinking here. They agree that two adjacent computational cycles of the brain’s work can be combined into one sensation. But they refuse to assume the existence of more extended configurations of this kind.
Why? Well, there may be two motives here: correct and not quite correct.
On the one hand, we have here a special case of the anthropic principle. It can be argued that the anthropic principle inevitably forces the individual Planck moments of my brain’s existence to merge into my current sense of self. But the anthropic principle will not necessarily force my current sense of self to merge with my future sense of self in the same way.
On the other hand, many transhumanists want to believe in the ease of implementing projects like “mind uploading.” If the life of consciousness does not represent a single track, then “mind uploading” will be much easier to implement. Therefore, many people like to believe in a kind of Buddhism, where I-now exists, but I-chronoblock does not exist.
Which of the motives drives you more is up to you to decide.
Causal interactions? The answer is rather trivial. In order for the separate meaningless Planck moments of the brain’s existence to be able to combine into “granules of qualia” that have integrity in time, they must be connected by something. It is usually assumed that there are causal relationships behind this, which can be likened to computational processes.
But many transhumanists, it seems to me, show some duality of thinking here. They agree that two adjacent computational cycles of the brain’s work can be combined into one sensation. But they refuse to assume the existence of more extended configurations of this kind.
Why? Well, there may be two motives here: correct and not quite correct.
On the one hand, we have here a special case of the anthropic principle. It can be argued that the anthropic principle inevitably forces the individual Planck moments of my brain’s existence to merge into my current sense of self. But the anthropic principle will not necessarily force my current sense of self to merge with my future sense of self in the same way.
On the other hand, many transhumanists want to believe in the ease of implementing projects like “mind uploading.” If the life of consciousness does not represent a single track, then “mind uploading” will be much easier to implement. Therefore, many people like to believe in a kind of Buddhism, where I-now exists, but I-chronoblock does not exist.
Which of the motives drives you more is up to you to decide.