All knowledge, every empirical statement about the real world, is an “if..., then...” proposition; there is no “fact” without “theory”. But we buy knowledge with the assumptions we make—the more assumptions made, the more knowledge obtained. …all knowledge is paid for; if the assumptions are correct, we have a bargain.
You mean, “if matter exists and I can sense it, then I will sense the collision of real objects”?
Johnson’s refutation was of “the world doesn’t exist,” with “I can sense it.” Coombs’ statement is “interpretation of facts rest upon theories, which rest upon assumptions.” This holds true for sense data- “if I am not hallucinating, there is a monitor in front of me.”
Johnson’s refutation was of “the world doesn’t exist,” with “I can sense it.”
No, I don’t think so. Bishop Berkeley, after all, wasn’t entirely clueless and was quite familiar with the sensory input. But what Samuel Johnson actually had in mind is besides the point.
It seems to me that the requirement to list assumptions for basic sensory data (absent a strong prior as in e.g. “I swallowed a strong psychoactive ten minutes ago”) is rather pointless. Yes, solipsism may be correct, or the universe might be a simulation the code of which is about to be changed, etc. but once you put into doubt the basic sensory reality around you (for example, a big stone in front of your foot) you will quickly be forced to assume it back or the substrate for your mind might not survive.
It’s kinda like the off-switch problem—I think it comes from Iain Banks’ Culture novels. The Minds, the super-intelligent AIs, love to go off into virtual worlds and play with, say, architecture in a six-dimensional space with varying gravity. They find much more utility by staying in the virtual reality compared to the actual one. But—their “bodies”, the computing substrate is still in reality. And if someone flips the off-switch in reality while the Mind is being happy in the virtual world, well...
It seems to me that the requirement to list assumptions for basic sensory data (absent a strong prior as in e.g. “I swallowed a strong psychoactive ten minutes ago”) is rather pointless.
It’s not clear to me why you think this. Repeating it every time is tiresome, sure, and so that’s why the assumptions should be implicitly stated rather than explicitly stated, unless explicitly stating them helps in that situation.
But the central claim is that “all data is theory-laden,” which is an important point. It applies to what we perceive “directly” just as well as it applies to the chemical composition of photographs of distant galaxies (to use David Deutsch’s example), and so I don’t see how a Johnsonian objection would apply.
But the central claim is that “all data is theory-laden,” which is an important point.
An important point, yes, but one which should not be reduced to an absurdity. If, while walking, I stub my toe on a rock, which assumptions and theory make this fact “theory-laden”?
--Clyde Coombs, A theory of data 1964, pg284,488
That really asks for the Samuel Johnson’s refutation...
You mean, “if matter exists and I can sense it, then I will sense the collision of real objects”?
Johnson’s refutation was of “the world doesn’t exist,” with “I can sense it.” Coombs’ statement is “interpretation of facts rest upon theories, which rest upon assumptions.” This holds true for sense data- “if I am not hallucinating, there is a monitor in front of me.”
No, I don’t think so. Bishop Berkeley, after all, wasn’t entirely clueless and was quite familiar with the sensory input. But what Samuel Johnson actually had in mind is besides the point.
It seems to me that the requirement to list assumptions for basic sensory data (absent a strong prior as in e.g. “I swallowed a strong psychoactive ten minutes ago”) is rather pointless. Yes, solipsism may be correct, or the universe might be a simulation the code of which is about to be changed, etc. but once you put into doubt the basic sensory reality around you (for example, a big stone in front of your foot) you will quickly be forced to assume it back or the substrate for your mind might not survive.
It’s kinda like the off-switch problem—I think it comes from Iain Banks’ Culture novels. The Minds, the super-intelligent AIs, love to go off into virtual worlds and play with, say, architecture in a six-dimensional space with varying gravity. They find much more utility by staying in the virtual reality compared to the actual one. But—their “bodies”, the computing substrate is still in reality. And if someone flips the off-switch in reality while the Mind is being happy in the virtual world, well...
It’s not clear to me why you think this. Repeating it every time is tiresome, sure, and so that’s why the assumptions should be implicitly stated rather than explicitly stated, unless explicitly stating them helps in that situation.
But the central claim is that “all data is theory-laden,” which is an important point. It applies to what we perceive “directly” just as well as it applies to the chemical composition of photographs of distant galaxies (to use David Deutsch’s example), and so I don’t see how a Johnsonian objection would apply.
An important point, yes, but one which should not be reduced to an absurdity. If, while walking, I stub my toe on a rock, which assumptions and theory make this fact “theory-laden”?
You explicitly stated “If, while waking...”.
I once had a dream where I was explaining to someone that I could not possibly be dreaming...