What do people in Chalmer’s vein of belief think of the simulation argument?
If a person is plugged into an otherwise simulated reality, do all the simulations count as p-zombies, since they match all the input-output and lack-of-qualia criteria?
They are meant to be arbitrarily accurate, and so we would expect them to include qualia.
However, in the Chalmers vein consciousness is non-physical, which suggests it cannot be simulated through physical means. This yields a scenario very similar to the identical-yet-not-conscious p-zombie.
They are meant to be arbitrarily accurate, and so we would expect them to include qualia.
Whose “we”? They are only mean to be functional (input-output) duplicates, and a large chunk of the problem of qualiia is that qualia are not in any remotely obvious way functions.
However, in the Chalmers vein consciousness is non-physical, which suggests it cannot be simulated through physical means.
If you think consciousness is non physical , you would think the sims are probably zombies. You would also
think that if you are a physicalist but not a computationalist. Physicalism does not guarantee anything about the nature of computational simulations.
Chalmers actual position is that consciousness supervenes on certain kinds of information processing, so that a sufficiently detailed simulation would be conscious: he’s one of the “we”.
They don’t exactly count as p-zombie, since they are functional simulations, not atom-by-atom duplicates. I call such zombies c-zombies, for computational zombies.
What do people in Chalmer’s vein of belief think of the simulation argument?
If a person is plugged into an otherwise simulated reality, do all the simulations count as p-zombies, since they match all the input-output and lack-of-qualia criteria?
Do they lack qualia? How accurate are these simulations meant to be?
They are meant to be arbitrarily accurate, and so we would expect them to include qualia.
However, in the Chalmers vein consciousness is non-physical, which suggests it cannot be simulated through physical means. This yields a scenario very similar to the identical-yet-not-conscious p-zombie.
Whose “we”? They are only mean to be functional (input-output) duplicates, and a large chunk of the problem of qualiia is that qualia are not in any remotely obvious way functions.
If you think consciousness is non physical , you would think the sims are probably zombies. You would also think that if you are a physicalist but not a computationalist. Physicalism does not guarantee anything about the nature of computational simulations.
Chalmers actual position is that consciousness supervenes on certain kinds of information processing, so that a sufficiently detailed simulation would be conscious: he’s one of the “we”.
They don’t exactly count as p-zombie, since they are functional simulations, not atom-by-atom duplicates. I call such zombies c-zombies, for computational zombies.