The first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie Universe Argument, if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience. You can’t assume that direct experience is epiphenomenal, meaning it doesn’t cause any behavior or calculation directly, and then also assume, “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience”.
If it seems unfair to suggest that Chalmers doesn’t know he himself is conscious, remember that to our eyes Chalmers is the one creating the problem; we say that consciousness is a major cause of our beliefs about consciousness.
I don’t think experience is epiphenomenal. As I said, I disagree with the Zombie world argument as proposed.
Nonetheless, it is not true that the first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie argument, even taken in that way. Because knowing I am conscious, not the saying of the words but the being, would itself be epiphenomenal, according to that theory. So direct experience could be the cause of someone knowing that he was conscious, because both of those (experience and knowing) would be epiphenonomenal, so that experience would not be the cause of anything physical (e.g. such as producing sounds that sound like someone saying “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.)
I don’t intend to get involved in another discussion, but a brief note:
if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience.
This definition is from hairyfigment’s comment. Since you didn’t challenge his/her definition, I assume this means you agree with it. However, if we use this definition of “knowledge”, the second paragraph of your comment becomes irrelevant. (This, incidentally, was also the point I was making in my response to UmamiSalami.)
The first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie Universe Argument, if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience. You can’t assume that direct experience is epiphenomenal, meaning it doesn’t cause any behavior or calculation directly, and then also assume, “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience”.
If it seems unfair to suggest that Chalmers doesn’t know he himself is conscious, remember that to our eyes Chalmers is the one creating the problem; we say that consciousness is a major cause of our beliefs about consciousness.
I don’t think experience is epiphenomenal. As I said, I disagree with the Zombie world argument as proposed.
Nonetheless, it is not true that the first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie argument, even taken in that way. Because knowing I am conscious, not the saying of the words but the being, would itself be epiphenomenal, according to that theory. So direct experience could be the cause of someone knowing that he was conscious, because both of those (experience and knowing) would be epiphenonomenal, so that experience would not be the cause of anything physical (e.g. such as producing sounds that sound like someone saying “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.)
I don’t intend to get involved in another discussion, but a brief note:
This definition is from hairyfigment’s comment. Since you didn’t challenge his/her definition, I assume this means you agree with it. However, if we use this definition of “knowledge”, the second paragraph of your comment becomes irrelevant. (This, incidentally, was also the point I was making in my response to UmamiSalami.)