he assassinations have to be successful, without the assassins being caught
Successful obviously. Failing to assassinate people is a terrible strategy. But the ‘without being caught’ is by no means required. In fact for that group that gave the role it’s name getting away was not even a high priority. It was far more important to make the killing public and visible so as to best demoralize the enemy leaders.
The authorities have to realize that pulling out would put an end to the deaths, but not decide to retaliate by further victimizing locals with an ultimatum that they’ll continue until the assassinations stop.
Which of course moves things along to guerrilla warfare against an occupying force with terrible morale and weakened leadership. If your people are not in a position to overthrow the occupying force when they have that much motivation then you are pretty much screwed. My only advice is “don’t be you”.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities. Besides, if your group is revealed to be associated with assassinations, your opposition won’t stay secret.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same. Besides pulling off repeated assassinations is hard. The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same.
Yes, monolithic entities obviously have a strong motive to not submit to power moves by other monolithic entities. This applies to peasants going on hunger strikes, silly walks and fighting conventional battles just as well.
But occupying forces are not monolithic entities. If a general has 1,000 of his soldiers killed in a battle with resistance then he has a strong personal incentive to send another 2,000 so that he does not look weak to his superiors. If a general and his household is killed then the replacement has a personal incentive to let the other general in the occupying force be the one who orders the next massacre. Or, better yet, he has an incentive to not vie so hard for the promotion and instead pull whatever strings he can to be reassigned as a lieutenant general back in a different province. (Downgrade the respective ranks as appropriate to the extent of the occupying force.)
Point is: If it comes a time to resist an enemy with violence target leaders with extreme prejudice. Don’t play by unwritten rules of polite warfare. Those favor the oppressor.
You also have a strong personal incentive not to assassinate if it most likely leads to capture, torture, and having your entire neighborhood purged.
I think you’re dramatically overestimating how easy it is to pull off a string of assassinations. Sure, you can keep attempting assassinations with force that’s not capable of effective resistance in a straight military conflict, but you’re likely to keep failing.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities.
The Ismailis (assassins) would often wait around, explicitly to be captured and tortured. If you are expecting to lose the asset, it isn’t a significant liability.
The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
This is the more significant concern, especially since most conflicts today are inter-ethnic rather than inter-religious. Convincing a Persian Muslim to join a different sect of Islam and then assassinate another Persian is very different from getting a Palestinian suicide-bomber within range of an Israeli politician.
Successful obviously. Failing to assassinate people is a terrible strategy. But the ‘without being caught’ is by no means required. In fact for that group that gave the role it’s name getting away was not even a high priority. It was far more important to make the killing public and visible so as to best demoralize the enemy leaders.
Which of course moves things along to guerrilla warfare against an occupying force with terrible morale and weakened leadership. If your people are not in a position to overthrow the occupying force when they have that much motivation then you are pretty much screwed. My only advice is “don’t be you”.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities. Besides, if your group is revealed to be associated with assassinations, your opposition won’t stay secret.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same. Besides pulling off repeated assassinations is hard. The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
Yes, monolithic entities obviously have a strong motive to not submit to power moves by other monolithic entities. This applies to peasants going on hunger strikes, silly walks and fighting conventional battles just as well.
But occupying forces are not monolithic entities. If a general has 1,000 of his soldiers killed in a battle with resistance then he has a strong personal incentive to send another 2,000 so that he does not look weak to his superiors. If a general and his household is killed then the replacement has a personal incentive to let the other general in the occupying force be the one who orders the next massacre. Or, better yet, he has an incentive to not vie so hard for the promotion and instead pull whatever strings he can to be reassigned as a lieutenant general back in a different province. (Downgrade the respective ranks as appropriate to the extent of the occupying force.)
Point is: If it comes a time to resist an enemy with violence target leaders with extreme prejudice. Don’t play by unwritten rules of polite warfare. Those favor the oppressor.
You also have a strong personal incentive not to assassinate if it most likely leads to capture, torture, and having your entire neighborhood purged.
I think you’re dramatically overestimating how easy it is to pull off a string of assassinations. Sure, you can keep attempting assassinations with force that’s not capable of effective resistance in a straight military conflict, but you’re likely to keep failing.
The Ismailis (assassins) would often wait around, explicitly to be captured and tortured. If you are expecting to lose the asset, it isn’t a significant liability.
This is the more significant concern, especially since most conflicts today are inter-ethnic rather than inter-religious. Convincing a Persian Muslim to join a different sect of Islam and then assassinate another Persian is very different from getting a Palestinian suicide-bomber within range of an Israeli politician.