fish also lack a laminated and columnar organization of neural regions that are strongly interconnected by reciprocal feedforward and feedback circuitry
Yeah that doesn’t mean much in itself: “Laminated and columnar” is how the neurons are arranged in space, but what matters algorithmically is how they’re connected. The bird pallium is neither laminated nor columnar, but is AFAICT functionally equivalent to a mammal cortex.
Which seems a little silly for me because I’m fairly certain humans without a cortex also show nociceptive behaviours?
My opinion (which is outside the scope of this series) is: (1) mammals without a cortex are not conscious, and (2) mammals without a cortex show nociceptive behaviors, and (3) nociceptive behaviors are not in themselves proof of “feeling pain” in the sense of consciousness. Argument for (3): You can also make a very simple mechanical mechanism (e.g. a bimetallic strip attached to a mousetrap-type mechanism) that quickly “recoils” from touching hot surfaces, but it seems pretty implausible that this mechanical mechanism “feels pain”.
(I think we’re in agreement on this?)
~~
I know nothing about octopus nervous systems and am not currently planning to learn, sorry.
what matters algorithmically is how they’re connected
I just realised that quote didn’t meant what I thought it did. But yes I do understand this and Key seems to think the recurrent connections just aren’t strong (they are ‘diffusely interconnected’. but whether this means they have an intuitive self model or not honestly who knows, do you have any ideas of how you’d test it? maybe like Graziano does with attentional control?)
(I think we’re in agreement on this?)
Oh yes definitely.
I know nothing about octopus nervous systems and am not currently planning to learn, sorry.
Heheh that’s alright I wasn’t expecting you too thanks for thinking about it for a moment anyway. I will simply have to learn myself.
Yeah that doesn’t mean much in itself: “Laminated and columnar” is how the neurons are arranged in space, but what matters algorithmically is how they’re connected. The bird pallium is neither laminated nor columnar, but is AFAICT functionally equivalent to a mammal cortex.
My opinion (which is outside the scope of this series) is: (1) mammals without a cortex are not conscious, and (2) mammals without a cortex show nociceptive behaviors, and (3) nociceptive behaviors are not in themselves proof of “feeling pain” in the sense of consciousness. Argument for (3): You can also make a very simple mechanical mechanism (e.g. a bimetallic strip attached to a mousetrap-type mechanism) that quickly “recoils” from touching hot surfaces, but it seems pretty implausible that this mechanical mechanism “feels pain”.
(I think we’re in agreement on this?)
~~
I know nothing about octopus nervous systems and am not currently planning to learn, sorry.
I just realised that quote didn’t meant what I thought it did. But yes I do understand this and Key seems to think the recurrent connections just aren’t strong (they are ‘diffusely interconnected’. but whether this means they have an intuitive self model or not honestly who knows, do you have any ideas of how you’d test it? maybe like Graziano does with attentional control?)
Oh yes definitely.
Heheh that’s alright I wasn’t expecting you too thanks for thinking about it for a moment anyway. I will simply have to learn myself.