I’m a precedent utilitarian. I try to maximize utility, except when doing so would set a bad precedent that would lower utility later.
Precedent utilitarians are usually good about restraining from force. Yes, killing a rich miser and distributing her money to the poor might increase utility. But it sets the precedent that anyone can kill someone if they think of a good enough reason, and most people won’t be smart enough to limit themselves to genuinely good reasons. Therefore, precedent utilitarians generally respect the rule of not killing others. But in certain cases this rule breaks down. In the WWII example you mention, it doesn’t seem particularly dangerous to set the precedent that you can use force against invaders coming to kill your family.
I try to use the same thought process when evaluating when to use rhetoric. If anyone can use rhetoric any time it furthers a goal that they consider genuinely good, then there’s little incentive to use rational argument except on the rare hard-core rationalists who are mostly resistant to rhetorical tricks. I want to be able to condemn a demagogue who uses rhetoric without being a hypocrite. If I needed to use rhetoric in a situation where I couldn’t blame anyone else for using rhetoric, like trying to save my family, I’d do it.
(the problem with precedent utilitarianism is that the calculations are impossible to do with real math, and mostly just involve handwaving. But I hope it at least gives a sketch of my thought processes)
Yvain: “I’m a precedent utilitarian. I try to maximize utility, except when doing so would set a bad precedent that would lower utility later.”
I think this is an odd thing to say. Any utilitarian ought to be declining short-term gains that result in long-term losses. So why the need for this specific disclaimer?
Yvain seems to be using the term to mean a utilitarian (in the pure sense) who scrupulously considers the force of his example. The implication is that many don’t—we’re not talking about perfectly rational beings here, just people who agree with the principle of utility maximization.
I’m a precedent utilitarian. I try to maximize utility, except when doing so would set a bad precedent that would lower utility later.
Precedent utilitarians are usually good about restraining from force. Yes, killing a rich miser and distributing her money to the poor might increase utility. But it sets the precedent that anyone can kill someone if they think of a good enough reason, and most people won’t be smart enough to limit themselves to genuinely good reasons. Therefore, precedent utilitarians generally respect the rule of not killing others. But in certain cases this rule breaks down. In the WWII example you mention, it doesn’t seem particularly dangerous to set the precedent that you can use force against invaders coming to kill your family.
I try to use the same thought process when evaluating when to use rhetoric. If anyone can use rhetoric any time it furthers a goal that they consider genuinely good, then there’s little incentive to use rational argument except on the rare hard-core rationalists who are mostly resistant to rhetorical tricks. I want to be able to condemn a demagogue who uses rhetoric without being a hypocrite. If I needed to use rhetoric in a situation where I couldn’t blame anyone else for using rhetoric, like trying to save my family, I’d do it.
(the problem with precedent utilitarianism is that the calculations are impossible to do with real math, and mostly just involve handwaving. But I hope it at least gives a sketch of my thought processes)
Yvain: “I’m a precedent utilitarian. I try to maximize utility, except when doing so would set a bad precedent that would lower utility later.”
I think this is an odd thing to say. Any utilitarian ought to be declining short-term gains that result in long-term losses. So why the need for this specific disclaimer?
Yvain seems to be using the term to mean a utilitarian (in the pure sense) who scrupulously considers the force of his example. The implication is that many don’t—we’re not talking about perfectly rational beings here, just people who agree with the principle of utility maximization.