No. Obviously not. (This is not the majority position in this community).
interesting, can you explain your reasoning?
incommensurability of scientific theories
is that the thing where from one theory the other one looks bogus and you can’t get from one to the other? Seems to me that it doesn’t imply nihilism because using the full power of your current mind, one model looks better than the other. it might be the same as EYs take on the problem of induction here.
Yes, incommensurability is the problem of translating from one theory into a later theory.
Aristotelian physics, from the point of view of Newtonian physics, is absolutely stupid. It’s like Aristotle wasn’t looking at the same reality. Overstating slightly to make a point, Newtonian physics, from the point of view of relativistic physics, is manifestly false. It’s like Newton wasn’t looking at the same reality. How many times must the circle repeat before the Bayesian conclusion is that the different scientists were not looking at the same reality? By the principle of incommensurability, you can’t say that the earlier theory can be massaged into a more simplistic version of the later theory.
If different scientists are looking at a different reality, how on earth did we keep making better predictions? Thus the appeal to the regularity of phenomena, which rescues the concept of scientific progress even if we think that our model is likely to be considered utter nonsense a generation or so into the future.
ETA: The social position of science is an expansion of the halo effect point I made.
interesting, can you explain your reasoning?
is that the thing where from one theory the other one looks bogus and you can’t get from one to the other? Seems to me that it doesn’t imply nihilism because using the full power of your current mind, one model looks better than the other. it might be the same as EYs take on the problem of induction here.
Yes, incommensurability is the problem of translating from one theory into a later theory.
If different scientists are looking at a different reality, how on earth did we keep making better predictions? Thus the appeal to the regularity of phenomena, which rescues the concept of scientific progress even if we think that our model is likely to be considered utter nonsense a generation or so into the future.
ETA: The social position of science is an expansion of the halo effect point I made.