There’s an ordinary selection mechanism for politicians, and an ordinary selection mechanism for lords of the manor.
Ideally, the ordinary selection mechanism for politicians (elections) would choose people who define success the way the voter would define success. That said, we both know that this is not how things actually work. For principal-agent delegation reasons, politicians often have their own agendas that conflict with voter preferences. The politician agenda diverges increasingly from the voter agenda as the number of voters increases (i.e. national figures generally have more freedom to pursue their own ends than county officials).
Still, politician agendas cannot completely diverge from voter preferences. Observationally, many voter preferences are implemented into law. As an extreme example, bribery is illegal even though the prohibition is bad for most politicians. So there is reason to think that the ordinary selection process for politicians leads to some connection in the definition of success (teleologically, if not cognitively).
By contrast, there is no particular reason to think the ordinary selection mechanism (inheritance) picks lords of the manor who want to implement tenant farmers preferences. Unless you include revolutionary change, which does not seem like an ordinary selection process.
There’s an ordinary selection mechanism for politicians, and an ordinary selection mechanism for lords of the manor.
Ideally, the ordinary selection mechanism for politicians (elections) would choose people who define success the way the voter would define success. That said, we both know that this is not how things actually work. For principal-agent delegation reasons, politicians often have their own agendas that conflict with voter preferences. The politician agenda diverges increasingly from the voter agenda as the number of voters increases (i.e. national figures generally have more freedom to pursue their own ends than county officials).
Still, politician agendas cannot completely diverge from voter preferences. Observationally, many voter preferences are implemented into law. As an extreme example, bribery is illegal even though the prohibition is bad for most politicians. So there is reason to think that the ordinary selection process for politicians leads to some connection in the definition of success (teleologically, if not cognitively).
By contrast, there is no particular reason to think the ordinary selection mechanism (inheritance) picks lords of the manor who want to implement tenant farmers preferences. Unless you include revolutionary change, which does not seem like an ordinary selection process.
I think that is what I was trying to say, but you said it much better.