This is a fully general argument against historical analysis. I can’t think of a single historian who isn’t incredibly selective.
No, it really isn’t. Our confidence in empirical propositions from the history / social sciences disciplines is structurally lower than our confidence in empirical propositions from hard science. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t point to some empirical propositions and say “Not likely enough for further consideration.”
Even if I agreed with everything it has done so far and is likely to do in the near future, I probably wouldn’t like what it does in a few decades or centuries.
We were having a discussion elsewhere about whether “moral progress” and “moral regress” were meaningful labels. Establishing our disagreement on those points seems to be a prerequisite for figuring out what we can and can’t learn from history. At the very least, agreement on terminology is necessary to shorten inferential distance enough for us to even have a conversation.
No, it really isn’t. Our confidence in empirical propositions from the history / social sciences disciplines is structurally lower than our confidence in empirical propositions from hard science. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t point to some empirical propositions and say “Not likely enough for further consideration.”
We were having a discussion elsewhere about whether “moral progress” and “moral regress” were meaningful labels. Establishing our disagreement on those points seems to be a prerequisite for figuring out what we can and can’t learn from history. At the very least, agreement on terminology is necessary to shorten inferential distance enough for us to even have a conversation.