If the coin therein is defined as a quantum one then yes, without hesitation. If it is a logical coin then things get complicated.
All is explained.
This is more ambiguous than you realize. Sure, the dismissive part came through but it doesn’t quite give your answer. ie. Not all people would give the same response to counterfactual mugging as Transparent Probabilistic Newcomb’s and you may notice that even I had to provide multiple caveats to provide my own answer there despite for most part making the same kind of decision.
Let’s just assume your answer is “Two Box!”. In that case I wonder whether the problem is that you just outright two box on pure Newcomb’s Problem or whether you revert to CDT intuitions when the details get complicated. Assuming you win at Newcomb’s Problem but two box on the variant then I suppose that would indicate the problem is in one of:
Being able to see the money rather than being merely being aware of it through abstract thought switched you into a CDT based ‘near mode’ thought pattern.
You want to be the kind of person who two-boxes when unlucky even though this means that you may actually not have been unlucky at all but instead have manufactured your own undesirable circumstance. (Even more people stumble here, assuming they get this far.)
The most generous assumption would be that your problem comes at the final option—that one is actually damn confusing. However I note that your previous comments about always updating on the free money available and then following expected utility maximisation are only really compatible with the option “outright two box on simple Newcomb’s Problem”. In that case all the extra discussion here is kind of redundant!
I think we need a nice simple visual taxonomy of where people fall regarding decision theoretic bullet-biting. It would save so much time when this kind of thing. Then when a new situation comes up (like this one with dealing with time traveling prophets) we could skip straight to, for example, “Oh, you’re a Newcomb’s One-Boxer but a Transparent Two-Boxer. To be consistent with that kind of implied decision algorithm then yes, you would not bother with flight-risk avoidance.”
If the coin therein is defined as a quantum one then yes, without hesitation. If it is a logical coin then things get complicated.
This is more ambiguous than you realize. Sure, the dismissive part came through but it doesn’t quite give your answer. ie. Not all people would give the same response to counterfactual mugging as Transparent Probabilistic Newcomb’s and you may notice that even I had to provide multiple caveats to provide my own answer there despite for most part making the same kind of decision.
Let’s just assume your answer is “Two Box!”. In that case I wonder whether the problem is that you just outright two box on pure Newcomb’s Problem or whether you revert to CDT intuitions when the details get complicated. Assuming you win at Newcomb’s Problem but two box on the variant then I suppose that would indicate the problem is in one of:
Being able to see the money rather than being merely being aware of it through abstract thought switched you into a CDT based ‘near mode’ thought pattern.
Changing the problem from a simplified “assume a spherical cow of uniform density” problem to one that actually allows uncertainty changes things for you. (It does for some.)
You want to be the kind of person who two-boxes when unlucky even though this means that you may actually not have been unlucky at all but instead have manufactured your own undesirable circumstance. (Even more people stumble here, assuming they get this far.)
The most generous assumption would be that your problem comes at the final option—that one is actually damn confusing. However I note that your previous comments about always updating on the free money available and then following expected utility maximisation are only really compatible with the option “outright two box on simple Newcomb’s Problem”. In that case all the extra discussion here is kind of redundant!
I think we need a nice simple visual taxonomy of where people fall regarding decision theoretic bullet-biting. It would save so much time when this kind of thing. Then when a new situation comes up (like this one with dealing with time traveling prophets) we could skip straight to, for example, “Oh, you’re a Newcomb’s One-Boxer but a Transparent Two-Boxer. To be consistent with that kind of implied decision algorithm then yes, you would not bother with flight-risk avoidance.”