It’s strange. I perfectly agree with the argument here about rationality—the rationality I want is the rationality that wins, not the rationality that is more reasonable. This agrees with my privileging truth as a leading which is useful, not which necessarily makes the best predictions. But in other points on the site, it always seems that correspondence is privileged over value.
As for Newcombs paradox, I suggest writing out all the relevant propositions a la Jaynes, with non-zero probabilities for all propositions. Make it a real problem, not an idealized and contradictory one—basically the contradiction between the reports of 100 accurate trials by Omega, the assumption that there was no cheating involved, the assumption about no reverse time causality, etc. If you do so, your priors will tell you the right answer.
Ha—although I expect your belief in forward time causality is higher than your confidence in your use of Jaynes formalism.
It’s strange. I perfectly agree with the argument here about rationality—the rationality I want is the rationality that wins, not the rationality that is more reasonable. This agrees with my privileging truth as a leading which is useful, not which necessarily makes the best predictions. But in other points on the site, it always seems that correspondence is privileged over value.
As for Newcombs paradox, I suggest writing out all the relevant propositions a la Jaynes, with non-zero probabilities for all propositions. Make it a real problem, not an idealized and contradictory one—basically the contradiction between the reports of 100 accurate trials by Omega, the assumption that there was no cheating involved, the assumption about no reverse time causality, etc. If you do so, your priors will tell you the right answer.
Ha—although I expect your belief in forward time causality is higher than your confidence in your use of Jaynes formalism.