If I know that the situation has resolved itself in a manner consistent with the hypothesis that Omega has successfully predicted people’s actions many times over, I have a high expectation that it will do so again.
In that case, what I will find in the boxes is not independent of my choice, but dependent on it. By choosing to take two boxes, I cause there to be only $1,000 there. By choosing to take only one, I cause there to be $1,000,000. I can create either condition by choosing one way or another. If I can select between the possibilities, I prefer the one with the million dollars.
Since induction applied to the known facts suggests that I can effectively determine the outcome by making a decision, I will select the outcome that I prefer, and choose to take only box B.
Prediction <-> our choice, if we use the 100⁄100 record as equivalent with complete predictive accuracy.
The “weird thing going on here” is that one value is set (that’s what “he has already flown away” does), yet we are being told that we can change the other value. You see these reactions:
1) No, we can’t toggle the other value, actually. Choice is not really in the premise, or is breaking the premise.
2) We can toggle the choice value, and it will set the predictive value accordingly. The prior value of the prediction does not exist or is not relevant.
We have already equated “B wins” with “prediction value = B” wlog. If we furthermore have equated “choice value = B” with “prediction value = B” wlog, we have two permissible arrays of values: all A, or all B. Now our knowledge is restricted to choice value. We can choose A or B. Since the “hidden” values are known to be identical to the visible value, we should pick the visible value in accordance with what we want for a given other value.
Other thoughts:
-Locally, it appears that you cannot “miss out” because within a value set, your choice value is the only possible one in identity with the other values.
-This is a strange problem, because generally paradox provokes these kinds of responses. In this case, however, fixing a value does not cause a contradiction both ways. If you accept the premise and my premises above, there should be no threat of complications from Omega or anything else.
-if 1 and 2 really are the only reactions, and 2 ->onebox, any twoboxers must believe 1. But this is absurd. So whence the twoboxers?
If I know that the situation has resolved itself in a manner consistent with the hypothesis that Omega has successfully predicted people’s actions many times over, I have a high expectation that it will do so again.
In that case, what I will find in the boxes is not independent of my choice, but dependent on it. By choosing to take two boxes, I cause there to be only $1,000 there. By choosing to take only one, I cause there to be $1,000,000. I can create either condition by choosing one way or another. If I can select between the possibilities, I prefer the one with the million dollars.
Since induction applied to the known facts suggests that I can effectively determine the outcome by making a decision, I will select the outcome that I prefer, and choose to take only box B.
Why exactly is that irrational, again?
Prediction <-> our choice, if we use the 100⁄100 record as equivalent with complete predictive accuracy.
The “weird thing going on here” is that one value is set (that’s what “he has already flown away” does), yet we are being told that we can change the other value. You see these reactions:
1) No, we can’t toggle the other value, actually. Choice is not really in the premise, or is breaking the premise.
2) We can toggle the choice value, and it will set the predictive value accordingly. The prior value of the prediction does not exist or is not relevant.
We have already equated “B wins” with “prediction value = B” wlog. If we furthermore have equated “choice value = B” with “prediction value = B” wlog, we have two permissible arrays of values: all A, or all B. Now our knowledge is restricted to choice value. We can choose A or B. Since the “hidden” values are known to be identical to the visible value, we should pick the visible value in accordance with what we want for a given other value.
Other thoughts:
-Locally, it appears that you cannot “miss out” because within a value set, your choice value is the only possible one in identity with the other values.
-This is a strange problem, because generally paradox provokes these kinds of responses. In this case, however, fixing a value does not cause a contradiction both ways. If you accept the premise and my premises above, there should be no threat of complications from Omega or anything else.
-if 1 and 2 really are the only reactions, and 2 ->onebox, any twoboxers must believe 1. But this is absurd. So whence the twoboxers?