Yudkowsky argues that such a being would notice that humans discuss at length the fact that they possess qualia, and their internal narratives also represent this fact. It is extraordinarily improbable that beings would behave in this manner if they did not actually possess qualia. Therefore [this being] would conclude that it is extremely likely that humans possess qualia. Therefore, qualia are not extra-physical.
Is that a fair representation of Yudkowsky’s argument? As summarized, it’s a purely circular argument: We know that a superbeing would infer that humans have qualia from the fact that humans talk about having qualia, because it is extraordinarily improbable that beings would talk about having qualia if they did not actually possess qualia.
Or, more briefly: We can infer that humans have qualia from the fact that humans talk about having qualia, because it is extraordinarily improbable that beings would talk about having qualia if they did not have qualia.
Is that a fair representation of Yudkowsky’s argument? As summarized, it’s a purely circular argument: We know that a superbeing would infer that humans have qualia from the fact that humans talk about having qualia, because it is extraordinarily improbable that beings would talk about having qualia if they did not actually possess qualia.
Or, more briefly: We can infer that humans have qualia from the fact that humans talk about having qualia, because it is extraordinarily improbable that beings would talk about having qualia if they did not have qualia.