If Holden believes that: A) reducing existential risk is valuable, and B) SI’s effectiveness at reducing existential risk is a significant contributor to the future of existential risk, and C) SI is being less effective at reducing existential risk than they would be if they fixed some set of problems P, and D) withholding GiveWell’s endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed increases the chances that SI will fix P...
...it seems to me that Holden should withhold GiveWell’s endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed.
Which seems to be what he’s doing. (Of course, I don’t know whether those are his reasons.)
What, on your view, ought he do instead, if he believes those things?
Holden must believe some additional relevant statements, because A-D (with “existential risk” suitably replaced) could be applied to every other charity, as presumably no charity is perfect.
I guess what I most want to know is what Holden thinks are the reasons SI hasn’t already fixed the problems P. If it’s lack of resources or lack of competence, then “withholding … while pre-committing …” isn’t going to help. If it’s wrong beliefs, then arguing seems better than “incentivizing”, since that provides a permanent instead of temporary solution, and in the course of arguing you might find out that you’re wrong yourself. What does Holden believe that causes him to think that providing explicit incentives to SI is a good thing to do?
AFAICT charities generally have perverse incentives—to do what will bring in donations, rather than what will do the most good. That can usually argue against things like transparency, for example. So I think when Holden usually says “don’t donate to X yet” it’s as part of an effort to make these incentives saner.
As it happens, I don’t think this problem applies especially strongly to SI, but others may differ.
That is indeed relevant, in that it describes some perverse incentives and weird behaviors of nonprofits, with an interesting example. But knowing this context without having to click the link would have been useful. It is customary to explain what a link is about rather than just drop it.
But C applies more to some charities than others. And evaluating how much of a charity’s potential effectiveness is lost to internal flaws is a big piece of what GiveWell does.
Absolutely agreed that if D is false—for example, if increasing SI’s incentive to fix P doesn’t in fact increase SI’s chances of fixing P, or if a withholding+precommitting strategy doesn’t in fact increase SI’s incentive to fix P, or some other reason—then the strategy I describe makes no sense.
If Holden believes that:
A) reducing existential risk is valuable, and
B) SI’s effectiveness at reducing existential risk is a significant contributor to the future of existential risk, and
C) SI is being less effective at reducing existential risk than they would be if they fixed some set of problems P, and
D) withholding GiveWell’s endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed increases the chances that SI will fix P...
...it seems to me that Holden should withhold GiveWell’s endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed.
Which seems to be what he’s doing. (Of course, I don’t know whether those are his reasons.)
What, on your view, ought he do instead, if he believes those things?
Holden must believe some additional relevant statements, because A-D (with “existential risk” suitably replaced) could be applied to every other charity, as presumably no charity is perfect.
I guess what I most want to know is what Holden thinks are the reasons SI hasn’t already fixed the problems P. If it’s lack of resources or lack of competence, then “withholding … while pre-committing …” isn’t going to help. If it’s wrong beliefs, then arguing seems better than “incentivizing”, since that provides a permanent instead of temporary solution, and in the course of arguing you might find out that you’re wrong yourself. What does Holden believe that causes him to think that providing explicit incentives to SI is a good thing to do?
Thanks for making this argument!
AFAICT charities generally have perverse incentives—to do what will bring in donations, rather than what will do the most good. That can usually argue against things like transparency, for example. So I think when Holden usually says “don’t donate to X yet” it’s as part of an effort to make these incentives saner.
As it happens, I don’t think this problem applies especially strongly to SI, but others may differ.
Relevant
That is indeed relevant, in that it describes some perverse incentives and weird behaviors of nonprofits, with an interesting example. But knowing this context without having to click the link would have been useful. It is customary to explain what a link is about rather than just drop it.
(Or at least it should be)
But C applies more to some charities than others. And evaluating how much of a charity’s potential effectiveness is lost to internal flaws is a big piece of what GiveWell does.
Absolutely agreed that if D is false—for example, if increasing SI’s incentive to fix P doesn’t in fact increase SI’s chances of fixing P, or if a withholding+precommitting strategy doesn’t in fact increase SI’s incentive to fix P, or some other reason—then the strategy I describe makes no sense.