I’d think there’s a simpler test: at what odds would I risk myself to save someone else? It’s a nice clean demarcation between valuing “me” and “life”. If I’ll run in to a burning fire where I have a 50% chance of dying and a 50% chance of escaping alive with one trapped person, then clearly I only value “me” because I’m a life. If I wait until I’ve got a 95% chance of rescue, then clearly I value “me” vastly more than I value life.
By using an actual-other-person, we have a very clear demarcation of what is, and is not, “me” :)
I strongly suspect that most people who risk their lives do so precisely because it preserves their identity. There may also be a EDT aspect here where I value {me who would rush into a burning building to save another’s life} more than {me who would not}. So if you have your identity invested at all into being a good person in that kind of way, I don’t think this thought experiment will be isomorphic to the one in which you’re under dangerous surgery.
There’s also the matter that me-changed-enough-to-be-a-different-person is a new person, at least to the extent of the change, while someone trapped in a burning building already exists. Most people (I think for good reasons even on simple act utilitarianism, but that’s another matter) value preserving life over creating new life.
I’d think there’s a simpler test: at what odds would I risk myself to save someone else? It’s a nice clean demarcation between valuing “me” and “life”. If I’ll run in to a burning fire where I have a 50% chance of dying and a 50% chance of escaping alive with one trapped person, then clearly I only value “me” because I’m a life. If I wait until I’ve got a 95% chance of rescue, then clearly I value “me” vastly more than I value life.
By using an actual-other-person, we have a very clear demarcation of what is, and is not, “me” :)
I strongly suspect that most people who risk their lives do so precisely because it preserves their identity. There may also be a EDT aspect here where I value {me who would rush into a burning building to save another’s life} more than {me who would not}. So if you have your identity invested at all into being a good person in that kind of way, I don’t think this thought experiment will be isomorphic to the one in which you’re under dangerous surgery.
There’s also the matter that me-changed-enough-to-be-a-different-person is a new person, at least to the extent of the change, while someone trapped in a burning building already exists. Most people (I think for good reasons even on simple act utilitarianism, but that’s another matter) value preserving life over creating new life.