Rawlsianism, however, includes min-maxing as well, which seems more normative.
I agree that the min-maxing of Rawlsianism is purely normative. What I was getting at was the veil of ignorance itself. Perhaps, it is worth explicitly saying, “oops, I forgot about that,” for this point.
If you are behind a veil of ignorance and optimize expected utility under SSA, then you will want the average utility in your universe to be as high as possible.
Yes, I agree. However, I still feel that if you are willing to believe in the veil of ignorance, you should also believe in SIA.
But such an original position is required for both SSA and SIA. To my mind, the difference is that the SSA original position is just a prior over universes, while the SIA original position includes both a prior over universes and an assumption of subjective existence, which is more likely to be true of universes with high population.
Again, I agree. However, I feel that the veil of ignorance needs both the prior over universes and the prior before the assumption of subjective existence since it is willing to modify existential properties of the observer, without which the observer would not have the same subjective existence.
Heidegerrianism doesn’t seem to believe in an objective universe in a direct sense
This is the very reason I believe that it should be OK with the “prior over universes” present in SSA. If reality is not objective, then it is easier to understand this prior as “uncertainty regarding the population of this universe” rather than “the potential of being in another universe which has a different population.” The potential universes and the actual universe become ontologically more similar since they are both non-objective. I have to admit that this is the point I am least certain of, though.
I agree that the min-maxing of Rawlsianism is purely normative. What I was getting at was the veil of ignorance itself. Perhaps, it is worth explicitly saying, “oops, I forgot about that,” for this point.
Yes, I agree. However, I still feel that if you are willing to believe in the veil of ignorance, you should also believe in SIA.
Again, I agree. However, I feel that the veil of ignorance needs both the prior over universes and the prior before the assumption of subjective existence since it is willing to modify existential properties of the observer, without which the observer would not have the same subjective existence.
This is the very reason I believe that it should be OK with the “prior over universes” present in SSA. If reality is not objective, then it is easier to understand this prior as “uncertainty regarding the population of this universe” rather than “the potential of being in another universe which has a different population.” The potential universes and the actual universe become ontologically more similar since they are both non-objective. I have to admit that this is the point I am least certain of, though.