This is a minor objection, but voting can’t be rational and it can’t be irrational. Voting isn’t a system of thinking. You may want to rephrase your argument as “voting is optimal if you...”
And as a followup, even if you’re correct about the probabilities (which I’m not sure you are), it’s not intrinsically optimal to vote, even if you care about the outcome. One must always weigh the opportunity cost of an action, and the opportunity cost depends on the person.
If a superintelligent AI is being built and an equal amount of Yudkowsky’s time will decrease the extinction probability by the same amount as voting would increase candidate X’s election probability, then it’s clearly not optimal for Yudkowsky to vote, because the neg-utility of extinction far outweighs the neg-utility of an unfortunate election.
My post was aimed at the sort of person who would vote in the Erewhon system, but not the real world; your objection applies to both. This post does a good job estimating the utility of voting in a close election; it seems to make sense for most rationalists in most elections at those stakes.
Re: rational and optimal, I’m countering a meme that calls it irrational to vote. I recognize that “optimal” is better usage here, but I wrote this for a wider audience that experiences different connotations.
This is a minor objection, but voting can’t be rational and it can’t be irrational. Voting isn’t a system of thinking. You may want to rephrase your argument as “voting is optimal if you...”
Or just “you should vote if”.
And as a followup, even if you’re correct about the probabilities (which I’m not sure you are), it’s not intrinsically optimal to vote, even if you care about the outcome. One must always weigh the opportunity cost of an action, and the opportunity cost depends on the person.
If a superintelligent AI is being built and an equal amount of Yudkowsky’s time will decrease the extinction probability by the same amount as voting would increase candidate X’s election probability, then it’s clearly not optimal for Yudkowsky to vote, because the neg-utility of extinction far outweighs the neg-utility of an unfortunate election.
My post was aimed at the sort of person who would vote in the Erewhon system, but not the real world; your objection applies to both. This post does a good job estimating the utility of voting in a close election; it seems to make sense for most rationalists in most elections at those stakes.
Re: rational and optimal, I’m countering a meme that calls it irrational to vote. I recognize that “optimal” is better usage here, but I wrote this for a wider audience that experiences different connotations.