Moral pluralism or uncertainty might give a reason to construct a charity portfolio which serves multiple values, as might emerge from something like the parliamentary model.
I still don’t think it would be a good idea to diversify.
If the parliament doesn’t know the budget of each charity beforehand, they would be able to improve on the normal decisions by betting on it. For example, if Alice wants to donate to Charity A, and Bob wants to donate to Charity B, they could agree to donate half to each, but they’d be better off donating to the one that gets less money.
A parliament that can make indefinitely binding contracts turns into a VNM-rational agent. But a parliament that can’t make binding contracts might always diversify.
Moral pluralism or uncertainty might give a reason to construct a charity portfolio which serves multiple values, as might emerge from something like the parliamentary model.
I still don’t think it would be a good idea to diversify.
If the parliament doesn’t know the budget of each charity beforehand, they would be able to improve on the normal decisions by betting on it. For example, if Alice wants to donate to Charity A, and Bob wants to donate to Charity B, they could agree to donate half to each, but they’d be better off donating to the one that gets less money.
A parliament that can make indefinitely binding contracts turns into a VNM-rational agent. But a parliament that can’t make binding contracts might always diversify.
If the parliament consists of UDT agents then effectively it can make binding contracts.