Just skimmed the post. Seems your notion of “unawareness” shares a cluster alongside with Knightian uncertainty and non-realizability in decision and learning theory.
There are indeed connections between these ideas, but I think it’s very important not to round unawareness off to either of those two. Unawareness is its own epistemic problem with its own implications. (E.g., it’s not the same as non-realizability because there are many hypotheses that are not self-referential of which we’re unaware/coarsely aware.)
Just skimmed the post. Seems your notion of “unawareness” shares a cluster alongside with Knightian uncertainty and non-realizability in decision and learning theory.
There are indeed connections between these ideas, but I think it’s very important not to round unawareness off to either of those two. Unawareness is its own epistemic problem with its own implications. (E.g., it’s not the same as non-realizability because there are many hypotheses that are not self-referential of which we’re unaware/coarsely aware.)