And what about the variant when the winged sandal was going to be given to charity, but the Baron rushed in to prevent that, arriving just in time?
Here it’s clear that the Baron still has legal ownership (just!), but that it’s the Baron who’s changing the status quo.
You could argue that a lot of law is about specifying what the disagreement point is (generally through ownership rules and contract law), but that doesn’t mean that our legal system’s choice of disagreement point comes from any intrinsic definition that makes sense (see the difficulty with intellectual property).
I rather lost interest in the winged sandal story, but for all the attempted complications, it remains quite clear. The Countess never owned it, and the Baron wants to secure his ownership first before offering it for sale. Whatever this is, it is not blackmail. Engrossing, forestalling, regrating, badgering, or cornering), perhaps, which aren’t even illegal any more in English law.
A lot of law is about specifying exact rules. The difficulty of doing so, precisely enough to decide cases, does not imply that there is anything philosophically problematic.
And what about the variant when the winged sandal was going to be given to charity, but the Baron rushed in to prevent that, arriving just in time?
Here it’s clear that the Baron still has legal ownership (just!), but that it’s the Baron who’s changing the status quo.
You could argue that a lot of law is about specifying what the disagreement point is (generally through ownership rules and contract law), but that doesn’t mean that our legal system’s choice of disagreement point comes from any intrinsic definition that makes sense (see the difficulty with intellectual property).
I rather lost interest in the winged sandal story, but for all the attempted complications, it remains quite clear. The Countess never owned it, and the Baron wants to secure his ownership first before offering it for sale. Whatever this is, it is not blackmail. Engrossing, forestalling, regrating, badgering, or cornering), perhaps, which aren’t even illegal any more in English law.
A lot of law is about specifying exact rules. The difficulty of doing so, precisely enough to decide cases, does not imply that there is anything philosophically problematic.