Where you say radio and radioactivity, I expect the rate of discoveries like that to slow as we discover a larger amount of the finite “things to discover”.
But as for making use of discoveries, the middle of the 1900s saw LASERs (1960), transistors (1950s), optical fibre (1952), credit cards, barcodes, solar cells, hovercrft, superglue, tippex, hard disks, satellites. All things which are arguably game changing, and giving 1890-1905 a run for it’s money.
Also, the early 1900s are somewhat distorted with things like Jet Engines, where turbines were proposed and patented in the 1790s, but unable to be built. As soon as the ability to build more precisely and strongly was developed, a lot of queued inventions popped up.
So it seems there will be a burst of invention after similar enabling technologies become widely available—when we can reliably build “enough” kinds of nanotechnology components, there should be a corresponding burst of already waiting low hanging nanofruit harvested.
Sure, I’m willing to agree that the 1950s and 1960s saw a lot also. But the question is whether there’s any substantial such activity now. Your point about queued inventions is very well taken.
The nanotech point might also be valid. Taken together that doesn’t mean that the pace of technological change is accelerating but that we should expect it to start accelerating soon.
Where you say radio and radioactivity, I expect the rate of discoveries like that to slow as we discover a larger amount of the finite “things to discover”.
But as for making use of discoveries, the middle of the 1900s saw LASERs (1960), transistors (1950s), optical fibre (1952), credit cards, barcodes, solar cells, hovercrft, superglue, tippex, hard disks, satellites. All things which are arguably game changing, and giving 1890-1905 a run for it’s money.
Also, the early 1900s are somewhat distorted with things like Jet Engines, where turbines were proposed and patented in the 1790s, but unable to be built. As soon as the ability to build more precisely and strongly was developed, a lot of queued inventions popped up.
So it seems there will be a burst of invention after similar enabling technologies become widely available—when we can reliably build “enough” kinds of nanotechnology components, there should be a corresponding burst of already waiting low hanging nanofruit harvested.
Sure, I’m willing to agree that the 1950s and 1960s saw a lot also. But the question is whether there’s any substantial such activity now. Your point about queued inventions is very well taken.
The nanotech point might also be valid. Taken together that doesn’t mean that the pace of technological change is accelerating but that we should expect it to start accelerating soon.