SV PAYW is mainly designed for people to signal both intensity and direction of preferences. My opinion is that it is close to optimal to create conditions for truth telling of preferences.
In the situation considered in the paper there are only two players, so they know how many votes have themselves and the other player and the previous sequence of votes. The “incomplete information” situation means that the true value of wining in a given round is public.
While the voting system is very general, the situation considered is very simple, so recursive Nash equilibrium can be computed and simulated.
As commented in the second paper, unfortunately the big question is how to vote, but to create a meaning vote space… the question “what to vote” is in my view the most important. See “the ideal political workflow”.
SV PAYW is mainly designed for people to signal both intensity and direction of preferences. My opinion is that it is close to optimal to create conditions for truth telling of preferences.
In the situation considered in the paper there are only two players, so they know how many votes have themselves and the other player and the previous sequence of votes. The “incomplete information” situation means that the true value of wining in a given round is public.
While the voting system is very general, the situation considered is very simple, so recursive Nash equilibrium can be computed and simulated.
As commented in the second paper, unfortunately the big question is how to vote, but to create a meaning vote space… the question “what to vote” is in my view the most important. See “the ideal political workflow”.