I observe the usual “Well, both explanations offer the exact same experimental outcomes, therefore I can choose what is true as I feel”.
Furthermore, thinking in the Copenhagen way will constantly cause you to re-remember to include the worlds which you thought had ‘collapsed’ into your calculations, when they come to interfere with your world. It’s easier (and a heck of a lot more parsimonious, but for that argument see the QM Sequence) to have your thoughts track reality if you think Many-Worlds is true.
Well, I didn’t quite say “choose what is true”. What truth means in this context is much debated and is another question. The present question is to understand what is and isn’t predictable, and for this purpose I am suggesting that if the experimental outcomes are the same, I won’t get the wrong answer by imagining CI to be true, however unparsimonious. If something depends on the whether an unstable nucleus decays earlier or later than its half life, I don’t see how the inhabitants of the world where it has decayed early and triggered a tornado (so to speak) will benefit much by being confident of the existence of a world where it decayed late. Or isn’t that the point?
You didn’t quite say ‘choose what is true’, I was just pointing out how closely what you wrote matched certain anti-epistemologies :-)
I’m also saying that if you think the other worlds ‘collapse’ then your intuitions will collide with reality when you have to account for one of those other worlds decohering something you were otherwise expecting not to decohere.
But this is relatively minor in this context.
Also, unless I misunderstood you, your last point is not relevant to the truth-value of the claim, which is what we’re discussing here, not it’s social benefit (or whatever).
the truth-value of the claim, which is what we’re discussing here
More precisely, it’s what you’re discussing. (Perhaps you mean I should be!) In the OP I discussed the implications of an infinitely divisible system for heuristic purposes without claiming such a system exists in our universe. Professionally, I use Newtonian mechanics to get the answers I need without believing Einstein was wrong. In other words, I believe true insights can be gained from imperfect accounts of the world (which is just as well, since we may well never have a perfect account). But that doesn’t mean I deny the value of worrying away at the known imperfections.
I observe the usual “Well, both explanations offer the exact same experimental outcomes, therefore I can choose what is true as I feel”.
Furthermore, thinking in the Copenhagen way will constantly cause you to re-remember to include the worlds which you thought had ‘collapsed’ into your calculations, when they come to interfere with your world. It’s easier (and a heck of a lot more parsimonious, but for that argument see the QM Sequence) to have your thoughts track reality if you think Many-Worlds is true.
Well, I didn’t quite say “choose what is true”. What truth means in this context is much debated and is another question. The present question is to understand what is and isn’t predictable, and for this purpose I am suggesting that if the experimental outcomes are the same, I won’t get the wrong answer by imagining CI to be true, however unparsimonious. If something depends on the whether an unstable nucleus decays earlier or later than its half life, I don’t see how the inhabitants of the world where it has decayed early and triggered a tornado (so to speak) will benefit much by being confident of the existence of a world where it decayed late. Or isn’t that the point?
You didn’t quite say ‘choose what is true’, I was just pointing out how closely what you wrote matched certain anti-epistemologies :-)
I’m also saying that if you think the other worlds ‘collapse’ then your intuitions will collide with reality when you have to account for one of those other worlds decohering something you were otherwise expecting not to decohere. But this is relatively minor in this context.
Also, unless I misunderstood you, your last point is not relevant to the truth-value of the claim, which is what we’re discussing here, not it’s social benefit (or whatever).
More precisely, it’s what you’re discussing. (Perhaps you mean I should be!) In the OP I discussed the implications of an infinitely divisible system for heuristic purposes without claiming such a system exists in our universe. Professionally, I use Newtonian mechanics to get the answers I need without believing Einstein was wrong. In other words, I believe true insights can be gained from imperfect accounts of the world (which is just as well, since we may well never have a perfect account). But that doesn’t mean I deny the value of worrying away at the known imperfections.