“Subjective” and even “is in the map, not the territory” are tricky concepts, because they primarily invoke two connotations, one of which appears to be bogus and distorts the other: (1) the question is determined/disambiguated by some attribute of some agent, such as its preferences, emotions, perception, knowledge, prior, etc.; (2) the answer to the question is somewhat arbitrary, can be picked based on unrelated considerations, can’t be confidently declared incorrect, is “a matter of opinion”, etc. Once the question is clear enough, it doesn’t matter where the data that determined it came from, the question (or its meaning) screens off its origin.
The map-territory distinction can make this confusion more subtle by giving a clearer and thus more salient idea of the agent-associated data that would disambiguate a question. This data doesn’t make the clarified question a “part of the map”, even though the map may contain (a representation of) it, and it doesn’t make the map some sort of requisite for the question. The question is still about the world, we’ve just used a map to explain what the question is. But once we have the question, there is no need for that map anymore, which is the sense in which (I’m guessing that) I disagree with the following point from the post:
The fact that there are three rocks on that beach is an objective fact of nature; it’s just that the meaning of that statement relies on the procedure of discretization being carried out, on someone or something defining what we consider a single discrete object and how we isolate it; and nature won’t do that for you. You do that with your brain.
I think I mostly agree with your analysis and disagree that it contradicts what you quoted from mine. We both agree that the question is about the world, though its meaning comes from the map. At this point you say that “there is no need for that map anymore”, which I’m not sure I understand; I prefer to just note that we had to use the map to come up with the question. After all, my original goal was to show that the thought experiment “let’s imagine the Earth before there was life on it, and see, we have a strong intuition that these questions still have the same answers even then” is ill-defined: without maps, the questions can’t be asked.
After all, my original goal was to show that the thought experiment “let’s imagine the Earth before there was life on it, and see, we have a strong intuition that these questions still have the same answers even then” is ill-defined: without maps, the questions can’t be asked.
In this context, my point is that having a map in the future, or in a hypothetical future, or only in our world where we construct the question is enough to pose the question, and after that you can ask it about worlds that don’t have maps and would never have them. So the thought experiment won’t be ill-defined if you use (refer to) a human mind to pose it (and you do), even though that mind is not a part of the thought experiment.
A: “Some say that judging the situation as funny or not funny is inextricably tied to humans and their particular values, but I think that’s not true. Imagine the Earth millions of years ago, before any humans were around, and imagine [insert a funny scene with some awkward behavior of dinosaurs and/or their offspring]. Even though no humans were around to laugh at these, I can’t help but think that the scene was funny. You don’t need humans to define what’s funny.”
B: “Some say that judging the arithmetical truth is inextricably tied to humans and their particular values, but I think that’s not true. [Repeat the scene with rocks on the beach billions of years ago]. I can’t help but think that 3 rocks + 2 rocks = 5 rocks in that scene. You don’t need humans to recognize 2+3=5 as valid”.
Now, your point works equally well on A’s and B’s stories. In A’s story, your point says that it’s possible to define the situation as funny (even though presumably we agree that funniness is very much anthropomorphic to a large degree) by reference to a map which is yet to come, or which exists outside of the imagined world. And I agree with that. But that’s not enough for A. What A wants to “sell” to you is the notion that funniness exists on its own terms within that imagined world, completely independent of the existence of humans and of their values. A really wants to see the situation as funny “on its own”, not because you, a human, is there/was there/will be there/could be there to judge it so.
Now, I happen to think that A’s position is indefensible, bordering on silly. Moreover, I imagine that B also feels that way about A’s statement. B thinks their statement is much more objective and “inherent” to the imagined world than A’s statement. B really wants to see 2+3=5 “objectively” embedded within the scene they’ve described without reference to hypothetical humans and their map to parse it, construct mental entities out of it, and count them. It won’t satisfy B if you say “Sure, there are 2+3=5 rocks on that beach, and that’s an objective statement about the situation, but only in the same sense as if you said the rocks were funny-shaped; in both cases you can say the questions are well-defined in Vladimir_Nesov’s sense, relying on the eventual/hypothetical humans coming along and providing a map to make sense of the questions”.
I think that B would disagree with that claim and consider their story much superior in “objectivity” to A’s. And my point is that B is wrong and A and B’s stories have the same status in that respect. I can present that status by saying the questions about funniness/number of rocks are ill-defined because no humans are around to parse them; or I can follow you and say they’re well-defined but only by virtue of humans eventually appearing to parse them. But I feel that there’s little to no difference between these two presentations; the important point is that B’s story has the same status as A’s.
And, since I’m apparently not satisfied with the length of this comment so far, I’ll reiterate that I don’t think this turns the laws of arithmetics into humanity-tied, “subjective” rules. I do think B’s final sentence is correct and you do not need humans to define 2+3=5 as valid. I just don’t see B’s story at all as evidence towards that conclusion. It doesn’t work as evidence for that. And that, I guess, is my original point 2.
“Subjective” and even “is in the map, not the territory” are tricky concepts, because they primarily invoke two connotations, one of which appears to be bogus and distorts the other: (1) the question is determined/disambiguated by some attribute of some agent, such as its preferences, emotions, perception, knowledge, prior, etc.; (2) the answer to the question is somewhat arbitrary, can be picked based on unrelated considerations, can’t be confidently declared incorrect, is “a matter of opinion”, etc. Once the question is clear enough, it doesn’t matter where the data that determined it came from, the question (or its meaning) screens off its origin.
The map-territory distinction can make this confusion more subtle by giving a clearer and thus more salient idea of the agent-associated data that would disambiguate a question. This data doesn’t make the clarified question a “part of the map”, even though the map may contain (a representation of) it, and it doesn’t make the map some sort of requisite for the question. The question is still about the world, we’ve just used a map to explain what the question is. But once we have the question, there is no need for that map anymore, which is the sense in which (I’m guessing that) I disagree with the following point from the post:
I think I mostly agree with your analysis and disagree that it contradicts what you quoted from mine. We both agree that the question is about the world, though its meaning comes from the map. At this point you say that “there is no need for that map anymore”, which I’m not sure I understand; I prefer to just note that we had to use the map to come up with the question. After all, my original goal was to show that the thought experiment “let’s imagine the Earth before there was life on it, and see, we have a strong intuition that these questions still have the same answers even then” is ill-defined: without maps, the questions can’t be asked.
(more on map/territory in this comment)
In this context, my point is that having a map in the future, or in a hypothetical future, or only in our world where we construct the question is enough to pose the question, and after that you can ask it about worlds that don’t have maps and would never have them. So the thought experiment won’t be ill-defined if you use (refer to) a human mind to pose it (and you do), even though that mind is not a part of the thought experiment.
Let me draw an analogy.
A: “Some say that judging the situation as funny or not funny is inextricably tied to humans and their particular values, but I think that’s not true. Imagine the Earth millions of years ago, before any humans were around, and imagine [insert a funny scene with some awkward behavior of dinosaurs and/or their offspring]. Even though no humans were around to laugh at these, I can’t help but think that the scene was funny. You don’t need humans to define what’s funny.”
B: “Some say that judging the arithmetical truth is inextricably tied to humans and their particular values, but I think that’s not true. [Repeat the scene with rocks on the beach billions of years ago]. I can’t help but think that 3 rocks + 2 rocks = 5 rocks in that scene. You don’t need humans to recognize 2+3=5 as valid”.
Now, your point works equally well on A’s and B’s stories. In A’s story, your point says that it’s possible to define the situation as funny (even though presumably we agree that funniness is very much anthropomorphic to a large degree) by reference to a map which is yet to come, or which exists outside of the imagined world. And I agree with that. But that’s not enough for A. What A wants to “sell” to you is the notion that funniness exists on its own terms within that imagined world, completely independent of the existence of humans and of their values. A really wants to see the situation as funny “on its own”, not because you, a human, is there/was there/will be there/could be there to judge it so.
Now, I happen to think that A’s position is indefensible, bordering on silly. Moreover, I imagine that B also feels that way about A’s statement. B thinks their statement is much more objective and “inherent” to the imagined world than A’s statement. B really wants to see 2+3=5 “objectively” embedded within the scene they’ve described without reference to hypothetical humans and their map to parse it, construct mental entities out of it, and count them. It won’t satisfy B if you say “Sure, there are 2+3=5 rocks on that beach, and that’s an objective statement about the situation, but only in the same sense as if you said the rocks were funny-shaped; in both cases you can say the questions are well-defined in Vladimir_Nesov’s sense, relying on the eventual/hypothetical humans coming along and providing a map to make sense of the questions”.
I think that B would disagree with that claim and consider their story much superior in “objectivity” to A’s. And my point is that B is wrong and A and B’s stories have the same status in that respect. I can present that status by saying the questions about funniness/number of rocks are ill-defined because no humans are around to parse them; or I can follow you and say they’re well-defined but only by virtue of humans eventually appearing to parse them. But I feel that there’s little to no difference between these two presentations; the important point is that B’s story has the same status as A’s.
And, since I’m apparently not satisfied with the length of this comment so far, I’ll reiterate that I don’t think this turns the laws of arithmetics into humanity-tied, “subjective” rules. I do think B’s final sentence is correct and you do not need humans to define 2+3=5 as valid. I just don’t see B’s story at all as evidence towards that conclusion. It doesn’t work as evidence for that. And that, I guess, is my original point 2.