But that’s A-theory, not presentism, which is being explained, right? This paper claims there’s a distinction
Yes. One can certainly be an A-theorist without being a presentist. Some people really have subscribed to so-called “moving spotlight” theories. (Hermann Weyl was an example.)
I’m less convinced that anyone was ever a presentist but not an A-theorist. The paper you cite doesn’t convince me for at least the following reasons.
First, the paper doesn’t even argue that any non-A-theorist presentists have ever actually existed. Rather, the paper attempts to show that such a theory is, as it were, technically possible.
Second, I don’t buy that the paper succeeds even at this. The author constructs the theory in Section 4. But the constructions essentially depends on a loophole: A-theories must posit A-properties, he says, but existence is not a property. Then, in Section 5.3, he deals with what seems to me to be the obvious reply. He allows that maybe A-theories only require A-facts, and not necessarily A-properties. If existence is a fact, then his construction fails. His reply is that “it is still possible to be a presentist without being an A-theorist: we need simply deny the existence of facts. … If there are no facts at all then there are no existence facts. … This is not an unreasonable view. There are metaphysical systems that do not posit facts—versions of substance theory, bundle theory, and so on.”
I find this unconvincing. I don’t know enough about these other theories to know how they get by without facts. But I suspect that they introduce some kind of things, call them faks, that do the work of facts. I suspect that the A-theory could just as well be held to require only that there are A-faks.
Yes. One can certainly be an A-theorist without being a presentist. Some people really have subscribed to so-called “moving spotlight” theories. (Hermann Weyl was an example.)
I’m less convinced that anyone was ever a presentist but not an A-theorist. The paper you cite doesn’t convince me for at least the following reasons.
First, the paper doesn’t even argue that any non-A-theorist presentists have ever actually existed. Rather, the paper attempts to show that such a theory is, as it were, technically possible.
Second, I don’t buy that the paper succeeds even at this. The author constructs the theory in Section 4. But the constructions essentially depends on a loophole: A-theories must posit A-properties, he says, but existence is not a property. Then, in Section 5.3, he deals with what seems to me to be the obvious reply. He allows that maybe A-theories only require A-facts, and not necessarily A-properties. If existence is a fact, then his construction fails. His reply is that “it is still possible to be a presentist without being an A-theorist: we need simply deny the existence of facts. … If there are no facts at all then there are no existence facts. … This is not an unreasonable view. There are metaphysical systems that do not posit facts—versions of substance theory, bundle theory, and so on.”
I find this unconvincing. I don’t know enough about these other theories to know how they get by without facts. But I suspect that they introduce some kind of things, call them faks, that do the work of facts. I suspect that the A-theory could just as well be held to require only that there are A-faks.
OK, thanks