There is no reason to update my belief on what the clone will do in this thought experiment since the thought experiment is about a zero probability event.
You are reasoning about an impossible scenario; if the probability of you reaching the event is 0, the probability of your clone reaching it is also 0. In order to make it a sensical notion, you have to consider it as epsilon probabilities; since the probability will be the same for both your and your clone, this gets you
%5E2%20+%20300%20\epsilon%20\cdot%20(1-\epsilon)%20+%20100%20\epsilon%5E2%20=%20200%20-%20400\epsilon%20+%20200\epsilon%5E2%20+%20300\epsilon%20-300%20\epsilon%5E2%20+%20100%20\epsilon%5E2%20=%20200%20-100\epsilon), which is maximized when epsilon=0.
To claim that you and your clone could take different actions is trying to make it a question about trembling-hand equilibria, which violates the basic assumptions of the game.
It’s common in game theory to consider off the equilibrium path situations that will occur with probability zero without taking a trembling hand approach.
You are reasoning about an impossible scenario; if the probability of you reaching the event is 0, the probability of your clone reaching it is also 0. In order to make it a sensical notion, you have to consider it as epsilon probabilities; since the probability will be the same for both your and your clone, this gets you
%5E2%20+%20300%20\epsilon%20\cdot%20(1-\epsilon)%20+%20100%20\epsilon%5E2%20=%20200%20-%20400\epsilon%20+%20200\epsilon%5E2%20+%20300\epsilon%20-300%20\epsilon%5E2%20+%20100%20\epsilon%5E2%20=%20200%20-100\epsilon), which is maximized when epsilon=0.To claim that you and your clone could take different actions is trying to make it a question about trembling-hand equilibria, which violates the basic assumptions of the game.
It’s common in game theory to consider off the equilibrium path situations that will occur with probability zero without taking a trembling hand approach.