It’s a bit annoying that this has to rely on an incorrect observation. Why not replace the human action, in state s2, with a simple automated system that chooses aH1? It’s an easy mistake to make while programming, and the agent has no fundamental understanding of the difference between the human and an imperfect automated system.
Basically, if the human acts in perfect accordance with their preferences, and if the agent correctly observes and learns this, the agent will converge on the right values. You put wireheading by removing “correctly observes”, but I think removing “human acts in perfect accordance with their preferences” is a better example for wireheading.
Adversarial examples for neural networks make situations where the agent misinterprets the human action seem plausible.
But it is true that the situation where the human acts irrationally in some state (e.g. because of drugs, propaganda) could be modeled in much the same way.
I preferred the sensory error since it doesn’t require a irrational human. Perhaps I should have been clearer that I’m interested in the agent wireheading itself (in some sense) rather than wireheading of the human.
(Sorry for being slow to reply—I didn’t get notified about the comments.)
It’s a bit annoying that this has to rely on an incorrect observation. Why not replace the human action, in state s2, with a simple automated system that chooses aH1? It’s an easy mistake to make while programming, and the agent has no fundamental understanding of the difference between the human and an imperfect automated system.
Basically, if the human acts in perfect accordance with their preferences, and if the agent correctly observes and learns this, the agent will converge on the right values. You put wireheading by removing “correctly observes”, but I think removing “human acts in perfect accordance with their preferences” is a better example for wireheading.
Adversarial examples for neural networks make situations where the agent misinterprets the human action seem plausible.
But it is true that the situation where the human acts irrationally in some state (e.g. because of drugs, propaganda) could be modeled in much the same way.
I preferred the sensory error since it doesn’t require a irrational human. Perhaps I should have been clearer that I’m interested in the agent wireheading itself (in some sense) rather than wireheading of the human.
(Sorry for being slow to reply—I didn’t get notified about the comments.)