Regret Theory with General Choice Sets by John Quiggen is a generalization of DT of more the sort I was initially hoping to produce. It doesn’t try to justify probability theory (it assumes it). Like me, it considers sets of options rather than only binary choices. Unlike me, it requires that if the bookie makes sequential offers, the bookie must keep all previously-given offers in the set (where I only require the bookie to keep the option which the agent chooses). This blocks the money-pump argument for transitivity, but still allows significant constraints on preferences to be argued by money-pump.
The result of this modification to the setup is that the agent can have many different utility functions which are used for different choice-sets. The condition on this is that the utility function must stay the same whenever the “best achievable outcome” is the same. (Best see the paper for that notion.)
Regret Theory with General Choice Sets by John Quiggen is a generalization of DT of more the sort I was initially hoping to produce. It doesn’t try to justify probability theory (it assumes it). Like me, it considers sets of options rather than only binary choices. Unlike me, it requires that if the bookie makes sequential offers, the bookie must keep all previously-given offers in the set (where I only require the bookie to keep the option which the agent chooses). This blocks the money-pump argument for transitivity, but still allows significant constraints on preferences to be argued by money-pump.
The result of this modification to the setup is that the agent can have many different utility functions which are used for different choice-sets. The condition on this is that the utility function must stay the same whenever the “best achievable outcome” is the same. (Best see the paper for that notion.)