Epistemic status: Random thought, not examined too closely.
I was thinking a little while ago about the idea that there are three basic moral frameworks (consequentialism, virtue ethics, deontology) with lots of permutations. It occurred to me that in some sense they form a cycle, rather than one trying to be fundamental. I don’t think I’ve ever considered or encountered that idea before. I highly doubt this is in any way novel, and am curious how common it is or where I can find good sources that explore it or something similar.
Events are judged by their consequences.
Actions/choices are judged by their adherence to virtues, which are considered virtues because of the types of consequences they engender.
Priority conflicts among virtues are judged by a given or agreed-upon set of rules, which say what the virtues are and how to enact them.
Conflicts between rules are judged by expectations of the consequences for future events of enacting the virtues/choices/actions prescribed by said rules.
This got me thinking. It may be a tangent, but still:
Seems to me as if values are what underpins it all. What do we value? How do we evaluate things? Once you have a clear enough picture of those two questions, the rest will follow.
Also: There will clearly be individual answers changed over time. Crafted by experiences, interactions and our very evolutionary foundation for ethics. That last part confuses the hell out of me. It seems so random. Like, I clearly deeply feel that reacting to things in my proximity is “right”, as opposed to tragedies happening “over there”. This makes evolutionary sense, but on an ethical meta-level it does not. My ethical instincts just seem arbitrary and dumb.
I have thought a lot about that. How can we trust our instincts are actually a “good” guide? They are shaped by evolutionary conditions long gone. Yet, it is so hard to think about morality without refering to my internal value compass. And some kind of value-basis is necesary. Also, would there be a cost to adopting morals that are “better”, yet not rooted in our internal value-compass?
Epistemic status: Random thought, not examined too closely.
I was thinking a little while ago about the idea that there are three basic moral frameworks (consequentialism, virtue ethics, deontology) with lots of permutations. It occurred to me that in some sense they form a cycle, rather than one trying to be fundamental. I don’t think I’ve ever considered or encountered that idea before. I highly doubt this is in any way novel, and am curious how common it is or where I can find good sources that explore it or something similar.
Events are judged by their consequences.
Actions/choices are judged by their adherence to virtues, which are considered virtues because of the types of consequences they engender.
Priority conflicts among virtues are judged by a given or agreed-upon set of rules, which say what the virtues are and how to enact them.
Conflicts between rules are judged by expectations of the consequences for future events of enacting the virtues/choices/actions prescribed by said rules.
This got me thinking. It may be a tangent, but still:
Seems to me as if values are what underpins it all. What do we value? How do we evaluate things? Once you have a clear enough picture of those two questions, the rest will follow.
Also: There will clearly be individual answers changed over time. Crafted by experiences, interactions and our very evolutionary foundation for ethics. That last part confuses the hell out of me. It seems so random. Like, I clearly deeply feel that reacting to things in my proximity is “right”, as opposed to tragedies happening “over there”. This makes evolutionary sense, but on an ethical meta-level it does not. My ethical instincts just seem arbitrary and dumb.
I have thought a lot about that. How can we trust our instincts are actually a “good” guide? They are shaped by evolutionary conditions long gone. Yet, it is so hard to think about morality without refering to my internal value compass. And some kind of value-basis is necesary. Also, would there be a cost to adopting morals that are “better”, yet not rooted in our internal value-compass?