If the human race ends soon, there will be fewer people. Therefore, assign a lower prior to that. This cancels exactly the contribution from the doomsday argument.
Ah, that makes sense. In retrospect, this is quite simple:
If you have a box of ten eggs, numbered 1 through 10, and a box of a thousand eggs, numbered 1 through 1000, and the eggs are all dumped out on the floor and you pick up one labeled EGG 3, it’s just as likely to have come from the big box as the small one, since they both have only one egg labeled EGG 3.
I don’t buy bostrom’s argument against the presumptuous philosopher though. Does anyone have a better one?
If the human race ends soon, there will be fewer people. Therefore, assign a lower prior to that. This cancels exactly the contribution from the doomsday argument.
And you get a prior arrived at through rationalization. Prior probability is not for grabs.
Oh, I see. How are we sure it cancels exactly, though?
see Bostrom’s paper
Ah, that makes sense. In retrospect, this is quite simple:
If you have a box of ten eggs, numbered 1 through 10, and a box of a thousand eggs, numbered 1 through 1000, and the eggs are all dumped out on the floor and you pick up one labeled EGG 3, it’s just as likely to have come from the big box as the small one, since they both have only one egg labeled EGG 3.
I don’t buy bostrom’s argument against the presumptuous philosopher though. Does anyone have a better one?