This is not a case where we have two definitions talking about two sorts of things (like sound waves versus perception of sound waves). This is a case where we have two rival mathematical definitions to account for the relation of evidential support.
What is this “relation of evidential support”, that is a given thing in front of us? From your paraphrase of Achinstein, and the blurb of his book, it is clear that there is no such thing, any more than “sound” means something distinct from either “vibrations” or “aural perceptions”. “Sound” is a word that covers both of these, and since both are generally present when we ordinarily talk of sound, the unheard falling tree appears paradoxical, leading us to grasp around for something else that “sound” must mean. “Evidence” is a word that covers both of the two definitions offered, and several others, but the fact that our use of the word does not seem to match any one of them does not mean that there must be something else in the world that is the true meaning of “evidence”.
The analogy with unheard falling trees is exact.
What would you expect to accomplish by discovering whether some particular e really is “evidence” for some h, that would not be accomplished by discovering whether each of the concrete definitions is satisfied? If you know whether e is “fortitudinence” for h (increases its probability), and you know whether e is “veritescence” for h (gives a posterior probability above 1⁄2), what else do you want to know?
BTW, around here “fortitudinence” is generally called “Bayesian evidence” for reasons connected with Bayes theorem, but again, that’s just a definition. There are reasons why that is an especially useful concept, but however strong those reasons, one is not discovering what the word “evidence” “really means”.
Thanks. I would say that what we have in front of us are clear cases where someone have evidence for something else. In the example given, we have in front of us that both, e1 and e2 (together with the assumption that the NYT and WP are reliable) are evidence for g. So, presumably, there is an agreement between people offering the truth conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’ about the range of cases where there is evidence—while the is no agreement between people answering the question about the sound of the three, because the don’t agree on the range of cases where sound occurs. Otherwise, there would be no counterexamples such as the one that Achinstein tried to offer. If I offer some set of truth-conditions for Fa, and one of the data that I use to explain what it is for something to be F is the range of cases where F is applied, then if you present to me a case where F applies but it is not satisfied by the truth-conditions I offered, I will think that there is something wrong with that truth-conditions.
Trying to flesh out truth-conditions for a certain type of sentence is not the same thing as giving a definition. I’m not saying you’re completely wrong on this, I just really think that this is not merely verbal dispute. About what would I expect to accomplish by finding out the best set of truth-conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’, I would say that a certain concept that is used in the law, natural science and philosophy has now clear boundaries, and if some charlatan offers an argument in a public space for some conclusion of his interest, I can argue with him that he has no evidence for his claims.
Thanks for the reference to the fortitudinence concept—I didn’t know it yet.
What is this “relation of evidential support”, that is a given thing in front of us? From your paraphrase of Achinstein, and the blurb of his book, it is clear that there is no such thing, any more than “sound” means something distinct from either “vibrations” or “aural perceptions”. “Sound” is a word that covers both of these, and since both are generally present when we ordinarily talk of sound, the unheard falling tree appears paradoxical, leading us to grasp around for something else that “sound” must mean. “Evidence” is a word that covers both of the two definitions offered, and several others, but the fact that our use of the word does not seem to match any one of them does not mean that there must be something else in the world that is the true meaning of “evidence”.
The analogy with unheard falling trees is exact.
What would you expect to accomplish by discovering whether some particular e really is “evidence” for some h, that would not be accomplished by discovering whether each of the concrete definitions is satisfied? If you know whether e is “fortitudinence” for h (increases its probability), and you know whether e is “veritescence” for h (gives a posterior probability above 1⁄2), what else do you want to know?
BTW, around here “fortitudinence” is generally called “Bayesian evidence” for reasons connected with Bayes theorem, but again, that’s just a definition. There are reasons why that is an especially useful concept, but however strong those reasons, one is not discovering what the word “evidence” “really means”.
Thanks. I would say that what we have in front of us are clear cases where someone have evidence for something else. In the example given, we have in front of us that both, e1 and e2 (together with the assumption that the NYT and WP are reliable) are evidence for g. So, presumably, there is an agreement between people offering the truth conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’ about the range of cases where there is evidence—while the is no agreement between people answering the question about the sound of the three, because the don’t agree on the range of cases where sound occurs. Otherwise, there would be no counterexamples such as the one that Achinstein tried to offer. If I offer some set of truth-conditions for Fa, and one of the data that I use to explain what it is for something to be F is the range of cases where F is applied, then if you present to me a case where F applies but it is not satisfied by the truth-conditions I offered, I will think that there is something wrong with that truth-conditions.
Trying to flesh out truth-conditions for a certain type of sentence is not the same thing as giving a definition. I’m not saying you’re completely wrong on this, I just really think that this is not merely verbal dispute. About what would I expect to accomplish by finding out the best set of truth-conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’, I would say that a certain concept that is used in the law, natural science and philosophy has now clear boundaries, and if some charlatan offers an argument in a public space for some conclusion of his interest, I can argue with him that he has no evidence for his claims.
Thanks for the reference to the fortitudinence concept—I didn’t know it yet.