I agree that from a functional perspective, we can interact with an LLM in the same way as we would another human. At the same time I’m pretty sure we used to have good reasons for maintaining a conceptual distinction.
I think of this through the lens of Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance; it’s a frame that we can adopt without making any claims about the fundamental nature of the LLM, one which has both upsides and downsides. I do think it’s important to be careful to stay aware that that’s what we’re doing in order to avoid sloppy thinking.
Nate Soares’ related framing as a ‘behaviorist sense’ is also useful to me:
If an AI causes some particular outcome across a wide array of starting setups and despite a wide variety of obstacles, then I’ll say it “wants” that outcome “in the behaviorist sense”.
I think of this through the lens of Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance; it’s a frame that we can adopt without making any claims about the fundamental nature of the LLM, one which has both upsides and downsides. I do think it’s important to be careful to stay aware that that’s what we’re doing in order to avoid sloppy thinking.
Nate Soares’ related framing as a ‘behaviorist sense’ is also useful to me: