Moral anti-realism shouldn’t insist that a person’s values are apparent to that person, what they currently think is good. Moral realism likes to declare the dubious assumption that everyone’s values-on-reflection should be the same (in the limit), but hardly uses this assumption. Instead, it correctly points out that values-on-reflection are not the same as currently-apparent-values, that arguments about values are worthwhile. But the same should be the case when we allow (normative) orthogonality, where everyone’s values-on-reflection can (normatively) end up different. Worthwhile arguments can even be provided by one person to another, about that other’s person misunderstanding of their own different values.
my actions can be justified by what I think is good, and your actions can be justified by what you think is good, and these things can disagree
Moral anti-realism shouldn’t insist that a person’s values are apparent to that person, what they currently think is good. Moral realism likes to declare the dubious assumption that everyone’s values-on-reflection should be the same (in the limit), but hardly uses this assumption. Instead, it correctly points out that values-on-reflection are not the same as currently-apparent-values, that arguments about values are worthwhile. But the same should be the case when we allow (normative) orthogonality, where everyone’s values-on-reflection can (normatively) end up different. Worthwhile arguments can even be provided by one person to another, about that other’s person misunderstanding of their own different values.