It’s easy to conflate three different things: 1. Whether or not there is an objective collection of moral facts 2. Whether or not it is possible to learn objective moral facts 3. Whether or not I should convince someone to believe a certain set of moral facts in a given situation
We can deny (1) with moral subjectivism. We can accept (1) but deny (2) by claiming that there are objective moral facts, but some (or all) of these are unknowable to some (or all) of humanity (moral realists don’t need to think that they can prove anything to others) We can accept (1) and (2) but deny (3) by saying that persuasion isn’t always the action that maximizes moral outcomes. Maybe the way to achieve the morally best outcome is actually to convince someone else of some false ideas that end up leading to morally useful actions (e.g. in 1945 we could convince Hitler’s colleagues that it’s righteous in general to backstab your colleagues if it meant one of them might kill Hitler)
So moral realists can accept that others will have other conceptions of good, and believe that the best options are to overpower or trade with those others (rather than convince them). They’re not perfect examples, but we’ve seen many moral realists do this throughout history (e.g. the Crusades). I think whether or not convincing others of your sense of morality is a morality-maximizing action depends a lot on the specifics of your morality and the context you’re in.
It’s easy to conflate three different things:
1. Whether or not there is an objective collection of moral facts
2. Whether or not it is possible to learn objective moral facts
3. Whether or not I should convince someone to believe a certain set of moral facts in a given situation
We can deny (1) with moral subjectivism.
We can accept (1) but deny (2) by claiming that there are objective moral facts, but some (or all) of these are unknowable to some (or all) of humanity (moral realists don’t need to think that they can prove anything to others)
We can accept (1) and (2) but deny (3) by saying that persuasion isn’t always the action that maximizes moral outcomes. Maybe the way to achieve the morally best outcome is actually to convince someone else of some false ideas that end up leading to morally useful actions (e.g. in 1945 we could convince Hitler’s colleagues that it’s righteous in general to backstab your colleagues if it meant one of them might kill Hitler)
So moral realists can accept that others will have other conceptions of good, and believe that the best options are to overpower or trade with those others (rather than convince them). They’re not perfect examples, but we’ve seen many moral realists do this throughout history (e.g. the Crusades). I think whether or not convincing others of your sense of morality is a morality-maximizing action depends a lot on the specifics of your morality and the context you’re in.