Error theorists are cognitivists. The sentence you quoted makes me think DaFranker is a noncognitivist (or a deflationary cognitivist,) he is precisely asking you what it would mean for U or D to have truth values.
By comparing them to abstract formulas, which don’t have truth values … as opposed to equations, which, do, and to applied maths,which does, and theories, which do...
When they are both trying to give accounts of what it would mean for something to be “right”, it seems this question becomes pretty silly.
I have no idea why you would say that. Belief in objective morality is debatable but not silly in the way belief in unicorns is.
The question of what is right is also about the most important question there is.
By comparing them to abstract formulas, which don’t have truth values … as opposed to equations, which, do, and to applied maths,which does, and theories, which do...
My main point is that I haven’t the slightest clue as to what kind of applied math or equations U and D could possibly be equivalent to. That’s why I was asking you, since you seem to know.
I am not assuming they have to be implemented mathematically. And I thought you problem is that you didn;t have a procedure for identifying corect theories of morality?
By comparing them to abstract formulas, which don’t have truth values … as opposed to equations, which, do, and to applied maths,which does, and theories, which do...
I’ll concede I may have misinterpreted them. I guess we shall wait and see what DF has to say about this.
I have no idea why you would say that. Belief in objective morality is debatable but not silly in the way belief in unicorns is. The question of what is right is also about the most important question there is.
I never said belief in “objective morality” was silly. I said that trying to decide whether to use U or D by asking “which one of these is the right way to resolve conflicts of interest?” when accepting one or the other necessarily changes variables in what you mean by the word ‘right’ and also, maybe even, the word ‘resolve’, sounds silly.
I said that trying to decide whether to use U or D by asking “which one of these is the right way to resolve conflicts of interest?” when accepting one or the other necessarily changes variables in what you mean by the word ‘right’ and also, maybe even, the word ‘resolve’, sounds silly.
That woudl be the case of “right way” meant “morally-right way”. But metaethical theories aren’t compared
by object-level moral rightness, exactly. They can be compared by coherence, practicallity, etc. If metaethics were just obviously unsolveable, someone would have noticed.
That woudl be the case of “right way” meant “morally-right way”.
That’s just how I understand that word. ‘Right for me to do’ and ‘moral for me to do’ refer to the same things, to me. What differs in your understanding of the terms?
If metaethics were just obviously unsolveable, someone would have noticed.
Remind me what it would look like for metaethics to be solved?
That’s just how I understand that word. ‘Right for me to do’ and ‘moral for me to do’ refer to the same things, to me. What differs in your understanding of the terms?
eg. mugging an old lady is the instrumentally-right way of scoring my next hit of heroin, but it isn’t morally-right.
Remind me what it would look like for metaethics to be solved?
Unsolved-at-time-T doesn’t mean unsolvable. Ask Andrew Wyles.
eg. mugging an old lady is the instrumentally-right way of scoring my next hit of heroin, but it isn’t morally-right
Just like moving queen to E3 is instrumentallly-right when playing chess, but not morally right. The difference is that in the chess and heroin examples, a specific reference point is being explicitly plucked out of thought-space (Right::Chess; Right::Scoring my next hit,) which doesn’t refer to me at all. Mugging an old woman may or may not be moral, but deciding that solely based on whether or not it helps me score heroin is a category error.
Unsolved-at-time-T doesn’t mean unsolvable. Ask Andrew Wyles.
I’m no good at math, but it’s my understanding that there was an idea of what it would look like for someone to solve Fermat’s Problem even before someone actually did so. I’m skeptical that ‘solving metaethics’ is similar in this respect.
Just like moving queen to E3 is instrumentallly-right when playing chess, but not morally right. The difference is that in the chess and heroin examples, a specific reference point is being explicitly plucked out of thought-space (Right::Chess; Right::Scoring my next hit,) which doesn’t refer to me at all. Mugging an old woman may or may not be moral, but deciding that solely based on whether or not it helps me score heroin is a category error.
You seem to have intpreted that the wrong way round. The point was that there are different and incompatible notions of “right”. Hence “the right theory of what is right to do” is not circular, so long as the two “rights” mean differnt things. Whcih they do (theorertical correctness and moral obligation, respectively).
I’m no good at math, but it’s my understanding that there was an idea of what it would look like for someone to solve Fermat’s Problem even before someone actually did so. I’m skeptical that ‘solving metaethics’ is similar in this respect.
No one knows what a good explanation looks like? But then why even bother with things like CEV, if we can’t say what they are for?
By comparing them to abstract formulas, which don’t have truth values … as opposed to equations, which, do, and to applied maths,which does, and theories, which do...
I have no idea why you would say that. Belief in objective morality is debatable but not silly in the way belief in unicorns is. The question of what is right is also about the most important question there is.
My main point is that I haven’t the slightest clue as to what kind of applied math or equations U and D could possibly be equivalent to. That’s why I was asking you, since you seem to know.
I am not assuming they have to be implemented mathematically. And I thought you problem is that you didn;t have a procedure for identifying corect theories of morality?
I’ll concede I may have misinterpreted them. I guess we shall wait and see what DF has to say about this.
I never said belief in “objective morality” was silly. I said that trying to decide whether to use U or D by asking “which one of these is the right way to resolve conflicts of interest?” when accepting one or the other necessarily changes variables in what you mean by the word ‘right’ and also, maybe even, the word ‘resolve’, sounds silly.
That woudl be the case of “right way” meant “morally-right way”. But metaethical theories aren’t compared by object-level moral rightness, exactly. They can be compared by coherence, practicallity, etc. If metaethics were just obviously unsolveable, someone would have noticed.
That’s just how I understand that word. ‘Right for me to do’ and ‘moral for me to do’ refer to the same things, to me. What differs in your understanding of the terms?
Remind me what it would look like for metaethics to be solved?
eg. mugging an old lady is the instrumentally-right way of scoring my next hit of heroin, but it isn’t morally-right.
Unsolved-at-time-T doesn’t mean unsolvable. Ask Andrew Wyles.
Just like moving queen to E3 is instrumentallly-right when playing chess, but not morally right. The difference is that in the chess and heroin examples, a specific reference point is being explicitly plucked out of thought-space (Right::Chess; Right::Scoring my next hit,) which doesn’t refer to me at all. Mugging an old woman may or may not be moral, but deciding that solely based on whether or not it helps me score heroin is a category error.
I’m no good at math, but it’s my understanding that there was an idea of what it would look like for someone to solve Fermat’s Problem even before someone actually did so. I’m skeptical that ‘solving metaethics’ is similar in this respect.
You seem to have intpreted that the wrong way round. The point was that there are different and incompatible notions of “right”. Hence “the right theory of what is right to do” is not circular, so long as the two “rights” mean differnt things. Whcih they do (theorertical correctness and moral obligation, respectively).
No one knows what a good explanation looks like? But then why even bother with things like CEV, if we can’t say what they are for?