Actually you deontology says you should NOT push the fat man . Consequentialism says you should.
I’m quite aware of that.
it is hard to make sense of that. If a theory is correct, then what it states is correct. D and U make opposite recommendations about the fat man, so you cannot say that they are both indiffernt with regard to your rather firm intuition about this case.
At this point, I simply must tap out. I’m at a loss at how else to explain what you seem to be consistently missing in my questions, but DaFranker is doing a very good job of it, so I’ll just stop trying.
moral theories are tested by their ability to match moral intuition,
Really? This is news to me. I guess Moore was right all along...
TL;DR: You should push the fat man if and only if X. You should not push the fat man if and only if ¬X.
X can be derived into a rule to use with D(X’) to compute whether you should push or not. X can also be derived into a utility function to use with U(X’) to compute whether you should push or not. The answer in either case doesn’t depend on U or D, it depends on your derivation of X, which itself depends on X.
This is shown by the assumption that for all reasonable a, there exists a g(a) where U(a) = D(g(a)). Since, by their ambiguity and vague definitions, both U() and D() seem to cover an infinite domain and are the equivalent of turing-complete, this assumption seems very natural.
I’m quite aware of that.
At this point, I simply must tap out. I’m at a loss at how else to explain what you seem to be consistently missing in my questions, but DaFranker is doing a very good job of it, so I’ll just stop trying.
Really? This is news to me. I guess Moore was right all along...
You have proof that you should push the fat man?
Lengthy breakdown of my response.
TL;DR: You should push the fat man if and only if X. You should not push the fat man if and only if ¬X.
X can be derived into a rule to use with D(X’) to compute whether you should push or not. X can also be derived into a utility function to use with U(X’) to compute whether you should push or not. The answer in either case doesn’t depend on U or D, it depends on your derivation of X, which itself depends on X.
This is shown by the assumption that for all reasonable a, there exists a g(a) where U(a) = D(g(a)). Since, by their ambiguity and vague definitions, both U() and D() seem to cover an infinite domain and are the equivalent of turing-complete, this assumption seems very natural.